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During the 1980s, tensions increased appreciably between federal
and state officials charged with regulating energy utilities.' The
conflicts that caused these tensions can be grouped into two broad,
though not mutually exclusive, categories.2 The first category
includes disputes that arose when economic determinations about
the need to build an energy facility in a certain area (often made at
the national or regional level) conflicted with local environmental,
health, and safety concerns.' The second category involves tensions
that resulted from dual economic regulation where control was appor-
tioned in some fashion between state and federal regulators. This
apportionment may have entailed concurrent jurisdiction,4 or an
attempted division of jurisdictional responsibilities into mutually
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1. See geeraUy Vince & Moot, Federal Preemption Versus State Utility Regulation in a
Poit-Mississippi Era, 10 ENERGY L. J. 1 (1989) (cataloguing major legal events in this area).
2. See, e.g., LITAN & NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION (1983).
3. One of the most striking examples of this type of conflict occurred in the cases
of the Sohio and Northern Tier west-east oil pipelines where parochial environmental
concerns in California and Washington thwarted a congressional determination that the
pipelines were necessary for national security and economic reasons. Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), Tit. V, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117, 3157
(1978) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 2001 (1982).
4. Concurrent jurisdiction may entail overlapping authority, as in state and federal
review of utility mergers, or an explicit effort to create complementary state and federal
authorities, as in Section 210 of PURPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1988). This Section of the
statute attempts to create a form of regulatory partnership between the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and public utility commrnissions (PUCs), resulting in
distinctive roles that are integrated through a regulatory scheme outlined in the statute and
elaborated by FERC. See infra Part 1, Section E.2.
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exclusive parts. In this category, the regulation was of the commerce
itself.
This Article focuses primarily upon the second category of
conflicts. It examines the two pervasively regulated energy industries
that have been subject to sometimes overlapping federal and state
control: electricity and natural gas. Jurisdictional tensions in both
areas have intensified as these industries reeled from dramatic shocks
largely caused by macroeconomic forces beyond the control of both
regulators and regulatees5 These forces, complemented by tech-
nological and legal changes, have reduced utility monopoly power
and, consequently, weakened the pre-existing system of economic
regulation created to utilize and control the exercise of that
monopoly power. At the same time, legislators and regulators
attempting to implement regulatory reform increasingly have used
their influence to expand the role of competition in these industries.
Increasing competition not only redraws the boundaries between
market forces and regulatory constraints, it also forces state and
federal regulators to rethink prior jurisdictional divisions.
This combination of greater competition and reduced monopoly
power has forced policymakers to reconsider major parts of the
traditional system of state and federal regulation that has dominated
each industry for over 50 years.6 The successful ,operation of the
pre-1970 regulatory system depended heavily on the ability of
regulated entities to exercise effective monopoly power. Because of
the near impossibility of setting efficient and timely rates, the entire
system of an administratively-determined rate structure depended for
its continued existence on the ability of a regulated firm to sustain
its earnings in the presence of substantial differences between
regulator-determined prices and efficient prices. Under these
conditions, only firms with substantial economies of scale that are
protected by strong legal barriers to entry can sustain earnings.
Regulatory constraints and protections thus provided an important
part of the economic framework that kept public utilities financially
viable and regulators politically safe.
By allocating risks and rewards, these regulatory constraints and
protections also critically affected the incentives for efficient operation
and planning. For decades, the regulatory structure spawned high
5. These forces include increasingly volatile price inputs (especially fuels and the
cost of money), changing macroeconomic policies, and greater interdependence with the
world economy. See infra Part I, Section B.1.
6. Reconsideration has proceeded quite far in the natural gas industry, and
somewhat less far in the electric power industry. See infra Part I, Section E and Part II.
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growth rates and major technological advances in the two industries.
The economies of scale inherent in the technology, enhanced by
monopoly franchise regulation, enabled regulated firms to make
large, long-term capital investments with little fear of competition.
However, starting in the late 1970s and lasting throughout the
1980s, macroeconomic, technological and, above all, public policy
changes in both industries weakened these monopoly powers. Conse-
quently, regulatory approaches that assumed the existence of
substantial monopoly powers were less sustainable: monopoly power
that had been eliminated could not be exercised.
This Article thus argues that the principal state-federal juris-
dictional tensions have resulted from changing public policy
objectives7 and dramatically altered market conditions, the former
in large part a response to the latter. It suggests that these
jurisdictional tensions are by-products of goal-seeking actions by both
private and public parties in response to dramatically altered
circumstances, and have not arisen in response to some overriding
ideological preference to rely on competition. Utilities face increas-
ing market pressures, and regulators at both the federal and state
level have far less room than previously for making pricing mistakes.
These changes also altered the rewards and risks imposed on
regulated firms. The pattern of risk allocation accepted by regu-
lators prior to the 1970s was a pattern initiated and supported by
regulated firms and their financiers. It was damaged, probably
beyond rehabilitation, by the political controversies surrounding
utility price increases in the 1970s and early 1980s. The pre-1970
pattern of risk allocation depended crucially on regulatory agencies
using their authority, and regulated firms using their monopoly
powers, to coerce end users into bearing the risks associated with
building large, long-gestation plants. The promised gain to end users
was a lower nominal price for utility services. The intensity of
opposition to the unanticipated price increases in the 1970s and
7. For example, regulators now are more inclined to promote economic efficiency,
and to rely on market discipline to do so, rather than to subsidize favored interests through
the rate-making process. Given reduced monopoly power and greater competition,
regulatory pricing mistakes are no longer acceptable. See infra Part I, Sections B.2 and F.
8. In particular, dramatically rising costs of production in the 1970s and 1980s
produced glaring differences in average costs of utility systems (the basis upon which most
services are priced). This, in turn, led to increased competition in trading between systems
and more competition from independent or non-utility power generators for both wholesale
and retail customers. These forces significantly weakened the monopoly power provided
by utility franchises thereby forcing regulators to worry less about cross-subsidization and
more about total cost. See infra Section B.2.
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1980s, especially price increases for plants that were not needed,
induced many regulators and legislators to shift risks from end users
to utility stockholders by withdrawing regulatory barriers and thereby
increasing competitive pressures on regulated firms.' The pre-1970
pattern of risk allocation thus proved to be a fair weather pattern-it
failed when it was really needed. The late 1980s have seen utilities,
their financiers, and regulators struggling to find a sustainable
pattern of risk allocation. Some seek to impose risks on end users
more firmly than in the past, while others would like to place
greater risks on utility stockholders. In the 1990s, intense bargaining
is likely to occur among the utilities, regulators, legislators, suppliers
serving regulated firms, and end-users over the issue of who will
bear the risks created by regulated firms investing in capital-
intensive, long-gestation projects, either directly or through long-
term contracts.
This process of reallocation of risks between the regulated entities
and end users is therefore likely to dominate many of the public
policy debates in the 1990s. The risk reallocation induced by these
public policy initiatives, in turn, will intensify state/federal tensions
as agencies at both levels respond in diverse ways to macroeconomic,
technological and legal events in the 1990s, partially replicating the
patterns of the 1970s and 1980s."0
Part I of this Article examines these issues in the electric utility
industry. Section A of Part I analyzes the two traditional models of
electric power regulation incorporated within the federal legislation
that established the current jurisdictional framework. Sections B and
C consider how the effort to reconcile these potentially conflicting
models through a bifurcated jurisdictional framework for regulating
wholesale power sales failed in the 1980s to resolve some major
state/federal tensions. Section D examines the emerging conflict over
transmission jurisdiction. Section E briefly examines how the
resolution of similar tensions fared under alternative jurisdictional
frameworks in related areas of electric power regulation. Section F
concludes that the acute state/federal tensions in the 1980s emanated
9. See, e.g., Gioia, The Prudence Standard: Recent Experience and Future Relevance, PUB.
UTnL FORT., Apr. 27, 1989, at 11-16.
10. Perhaps the most publicized example was the Middle South cases over regulatory
treatment of the Grand Gulf nuclear unit. FERC action on the allocation of Grand Gulf
costs served to curb, in the multistate holding company area, the ability of states to disallow
recovery on plant capital expenditures on grounds of "imprudence." State regulators had
used the prudence review process to systematically reallocate risks from end users to utility
shareholders throughout the 1980s. See infra Part I, Section C.
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directly from the failure of the pre-existing regulatory system to
respond to economic, technological, and legal changes.
Part II of the Article focuses on the evolution of state/federal
tensions under the dual regulation scheme in the natural gas
industry. Section A of Part II describes the four major legal changes
or milestones in the evolution of gas industry regulation which
marked substantial shifts in the boundary between federal and state
regulation. Until about 1980, regulatory authority gravitated from
state to the federal regulators; since 1980, the power flow has been
reversed. Section B examines the system of interstate pipeline
regulation created by the Federal Power Commission (FPC) in the
two decades after passage of the National Gas Act of 1938." Section
C analyzes the fatilures that occurred in this system of regulation,
arguing that they were caused in part by a landmark Supreme
Court decision. 2 Section D describes the effect of the National Gas
Policy Act of 1978 on state and federal regulators." Section E
presents FERC's responses to the system failures, emphasizing the
Order No. 436 reforms, which shifted some decisionmaking authority
from FERC to markets and to state PUCs. 4 Section F concludes that
the market-oriented reforms promulgated by FERC's Order No. 436,
and subsequent FERC orders pursuing Order No. 436 objectives,
have created a more efficient industry and have reduced tensions
between federal and state regulators.
The Article concludes by arguing that in the long run the
evolution of competition, in both the electric and gas industries,
should do more to relieve than to exacerbate state/federal tensions.
I. Electric Power Regulation: Regulatory Assumptions, Economic
and Political Realities, and Competing Federal Legislative Models
In the 1980s, increased tensions between federal and state
regulators often were attributed to efforts to permit greater
competition, such as federal regulatory reform of wholesale markets.
11. Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-
717w (1988)).
12. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 682 (1954).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 3301-3432 (1988).
14. FERC Order No. 436, Regulation of National Gas Pipelines After Partial
Wellhead Decontrol, FERC Stats. & Regs. 30,665 (1985).
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Others attributed these tensions to utility corporate restructuring. 5
While efforts to promote competition did contribute to federal-state
tensions, Part I argues that most of the increased tensions resulted
from the inability of the traditional regulatory system to adapt
sufficiently to major economic and legal changes.
Economic forces dramatically reduced the rate of demand growth
for electricity and increased the real costs and risks associated with
building new generation capacity. 6 The traditional regulatory system
proved incapable of efficiently adapting its ratemaking model to use
existing capacity efficiently and to create an efficient risk/reward
symmetry for generation expansions in this new economic environ-
ment. The result was over-expansion of generating capacity in the
face of declining demand, large and increasingly contested rate
increase requests, disallowed recovery of utility capital expenditures,
and a consequent aversion by utilities to major new capital expenses.
These developments were accentuated by technological advances 7
and highlighted the need for changes in the regulatory models that
had been accepted for almost four decades. Recognizing the
underlying causes of this tension is necessary to avoid distorting
future efforts at regulatory reform because of misunderstanding
about the source of state/federal tensions. Although commentators
disagree as to which regulatory reforms are needed, they are all
beginning to understand that the traditional regulatory system is no
longer conducive to efficient utility supply planning and operation.
In response to increased competition to supply power to utilities
(both from existing surpluses and new plants), federal and state
regulators have initiated significant regulatory change. The principal
federal economic regulator, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC) has promulgated a series of generic administrative
initiatives, typically rulemakings, and has resolved a number of
15. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON ELECTRICITY UTILITY REGULATION, COMMITrEE ON
ENERGY AND ENV'T, NATIONAL GOVERNORS' AS'N, AN ANALYSIS OF OnrIONS FOR
STRUCTURAL REFORM IN ELECIRIC UTILITY REGULATIONS 24 (1983) [hereinafter NGA
ELECrRIC REFORM REPORT].
16. See, e.g.. infra note 84.
17. For instance, advances in transmission and control technologies created
economies of scale that transcended balkanized retail franchises upon which the traditional
system was based.
18. See, e.g., The Electric Executives' Forum, PUBLIC UTILrIY FORTNIGHTLY, May 25,
1989, at 76-117 (comments of utility executives). For a broad view of where utility planning
should be directed in the future, see Pfister, Designing a Utility for the 21st Centuy, 2 Et.rC.
J., No. 9 (1989), at 16.
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individual cases so as to promote regulatory reform. 19 These reforms
were intended to facilitate the development of efficient wholesale
power markets. Because the stakes are high for the U.S. economy
and its international competitiveness, Congress has also begun to
show an interest in such reform.20 Electricity has grown steadily as
a proportion of total U.S. energy consumption, and projections
suggest that this trend will continue.2' Rational policymakers must
assume that the electric industry will become an increasingly
important part of the industrial infrastructure, especially in some of
the newer high-tech and service industries that rely critically on
electric power.
As electricity use expands, the possibility of severe capacity
shortages in the 1990s has increased. The capacity surpluses of the
1980s are disappearing in some regions, and demand growth has
outstripped projections for several years.2 For example, troublesome
19. The first significant public step occurred in May 1985 with a Notice of Inquiry,
Regulation of Electricity Sales-for-Resale and Transmission Service, Phase 1, 31 FERC 1
61,228 (1985) and Phase II, 31 FERC 1 61,376 (1985).
In March 1988, FERC issued three notices of proposed rulemaking relating to
reform of Section 210 of PURPA and to FERC regulation of "independent power
producers" (IPPs). These are often described as the "PURPA reform NOPRs." Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking: Administrative Determination of Full Avoided Costs, Sales of Power
to Qualifying Facilities and Interconnection Facilities, FERC Stats. & Regs. 1 32,457, 53
Fed. Reg. 9331 (1988); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulations Governing Bidding
Programs, FERC Stats. & Regs. 1 32,455, 53 Fed. Reg. 9324 (1988); Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking: Regulations Governing Independent Power Producers, FERC Stats. & Regs.
1 32,456, 53 Fed. Reg. 9377 (1988).
During the 1980s, FERC also approved two major multi-utility experiments in
reform-oriented wholesale and transmission pricing. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 25
FERC 1 61,469 (1983); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (Western Systems Power Pool), 38 FERC
1 61,136 (1987).
In a series of cases, FERC also has permitted liberalized wholesale pricing for
jurisdictional utilities displaying no "market power" or a willingness to mitigate market
power through transmission access. St. Joe Minerals Co., 21 FERC 1 61,323 (1982), reh'g
granted, 22 FERC 1 61,211 (1983); Cliffs Elec. Service Co., 32 FERC 1 61,372 (1985);
Citizens Energy Corp., 35 FERC 1 61,198 (1986); Howell Gas Mgt. Co., 40 FERC 1 61,336
(1987); Orange and Rockland Utils., Inc., 42 FERC 1 61,012 (1988); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 42 FERC 1 61,406 (1988), order on reh'g, 43 FERC 1 61,403 (1988); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 44 FERC 1 61,010, order on reh'g, 45 FERC 1 61,061 (1988); Ocean State Power, 44
FERC 9 61,261 (1988); Citizens Power & Light Corp., 48 FERC 1 61,210 (1989).
20. Senator Bennett Johnston, Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources, U.S. Senate, has introduced a bill, titled the Competitive Wholesale Electric
Generation Act, to "remove obstacles to competition in wholesale electric generation
markets," amendment to S. 406, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
21. In 1988, electricity comprised 35.8% of total energy consumed, up 3.6% from
the 1980 figure. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, MONIHLY ENERGY REVIEW (JUNE 1989).
22. See TRANSMISSION TASK FORCE, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,
EuxrucITY TRANSMISSION: REALITIES, THEORY AND PoucY ALTERNKAIVES 27 (1989)
[hereinafter FERC TTF REPORT].
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power supply shortages may be imminent in New England and the
mid-Atlantic region.23 Official U.S. government projections indicate
a national need for substantial generating capacity additions by the
Year 2000.24 Yet the history of the last decade reveals that very few
utilities have planned the major generation plant additions that
predominated from the end of World War II to the early 1970s.
21
Utility executives argue that their reluctance to build results from
the increasing risks imposed on utility stockholders by state legi-
slators and regulators.6 However, even if this capital averse climate
changes, the gestation period for most such additions is so long that
they will not contribute to the power supply for several years,
perhaps as many as ten. The difficulty and expense of adding large,
long-gestation generating plants on a timely basis will probably
increase: environmental regulation of coal-fired facilities will tighten;
nuclear licensing and siting proceedings may become even more
hotly contested; and the siting of all generation and transmission
facilities is also likely to take more time. Furthermore, quasi-judicial
regulatory proceedings that attempt to decide complex substantive
issues tend to favor due process concerns over timeliness and, hence,
further exacerbate other delays.27
Consequently, if power shortages are to be avoided, utilities will
have to emphasize short-gestation oil and gas plants.28 Since reliance
on oil and natural gas is likely to create upward pressure on oil
prices in the long run, the industry may shift to mid-gestation coal
plants once demand uncertainties are lessened by experience. 9 Such
coal plants will likely be much smaller than the 1000 to 1200
megawatt plants that predominated in the early 1970s.
23. Id.
24. FERC TrF REPORT, supra note 22, at 28-29.
25. For instance, the last new nuclear plant constructed (and not canceled) was
ordered in 1976. Few major coal plants have been ordered in the 1980s. See EDISON ELEC.
INST., ANNUAL ELEC. POWF.R SURVEY (1988).
26. See The Electric Executives' Forum, supra note 18, at 72-106.
27. See Stalon, Analysis and Synthesis in Quasi-Judicial, Multimember Regulatory Agencies,
in THE FUTURE OF ELECrIVCAL ENERGY (1986).
28. Excessive reliance on oil and natural gas was perhaps the most pervasive concern
driving the post-1973 "oil crisis" mentality that led to the National Energy Act of 1978 (the
generic name for five specific statutes, including PURPA). After initially shrinking in
response to conservation efforts, oil imports have been rising steadily in the 1980s. They
now account for a significant part of the nation's trade imbalance, and are rapidly
approaching 50% of the nation's oil consumption. Projections are that this dependence on
oil imports will increase. See UNITED STATES ENERGY ASS'N, U.S. ENERGY 1989, THE
THIRD ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES ENERGY POLICY AND PROSPECTS 2 (1989).
29. See Peoples, Power Generation in North America in the Future, PUB. UTiL. FORT.,
May 25, 1989, at 58-61.
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These observations indicate that regulatory reform is a pressing
necessity. There is a growing consensus among regulators that this
reform will have to recognize and adjust to recent efforts to increase
competition in important sectors of the industry. A revised regulatory
system also will have to allocate the risks associated with building
new generating plants that may not be needed immediately upon
completion. The legal controversies created by the price increases of
the 1970s and 1980s, which were induced by plants that were not
needed when completed, cast serious doubts on the sustainability of
the traditional regulatory approach. A new model will almost
certainly require that suppliers voluntarily carry some of these risks.
Such a revised system probably will require some role for nontradi-
tional generators.
Regulators are increasingly recognizing that competition can
complement a system of regulation that takes efficiency as a principal
objective. For example, competitive capacity markets, either accepted
or encouraged by state regulators, have emerged in several regions.5 0
Utility pricing flexibility and competitive discipline have produced
substantial improvements in equipment utilization."' These improve-
ments probably would not have resulted under detailed regulation
by FERC and state PUCs. For regulators who rank other objectives
highly, such as price stability or low rates for preferred classes,
competition may not be a welcome force. However, regulatory and
managerial discretion will continue to be reduced as the monopoly
power of franchise utilities continues to shrink. That consideration,
as well as increasing procedural and decisional complexity associated
with traditional regulation, may coerce regulators to accept efficiency
as the only feasible objective, and competition as a necessary tool for
achieving it.
Because FERC and the state PUCs share regulatory responsibility,
effective state/federal cooperation is necessary to achieve rational
reform. Yet, many of the forces that have undermined the effective-
ness of traditional regulatory approaches have also led to trouble-
some tensions between state and federal officials. While some of
these conflicts have been resolved in the courts, the legal results
seldom have produced a climate for constructive cooperation.
2
Instead, they have exacerbated a problem already present in the
system: state and federal regulators protect jurisdictional turf at the
30. See generally NATIONAL INDEPENDENT ENERGY PRODUCERS. BIDDING FOR POWER:
THE EMERGENCE OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING IN ELECTRIC GENERATION (1990).
31. See FERC TrF REPoRr, supra note 22, at Appendix A.
32. See, e.g., infra Sections B.3 and C.
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expense of urgently-needed reform." These conflicts also distort the
debate over the emerging role of competition and how it should be
reconciled with individual state and federal economic regulation.
Further conflict could lead to futile efforts to resurrect the traditional
regulatory system whose economic underpinnings have been
removed. Instead, the focus should be upon the complex task of
designing a new regulatory scheme that efficiently combines
competition and regulation.4
Moreover, these state/federal tensions also threaten to impede
efforts by entities within the industry to restructure their operations
to compete more effectively in changing markets. For instance, some
important efforts to restructure utilities have floundered in part over
state PUC concerns over loss of jurisdiction. 5 These concerns need
to be addressed; otherwise, increasingly bitter state/federal jurisdic-
tional conflicts will undermine efforts at reform designed to address
new industry realities.
A. The Evolution of Dichotomous State/Federal Jurisdiction Over Electric
Power Regulation
The Public Utility Act of 1935, which established the jurisdic-
tional divisions under which the electric utility industry has been
regulated for over fifty years, contained two different and poten-
tially conflicting models of economic regulation." These models help
33. Id.
34. The failure to do so could lead to serious efficiency losses. See FERC TTF
REPORT, supra note 22, at 73-79, 163-69.
35. Remarks by P.R. O'Connor, First Annual American Bar Association Conference
on Electricity Law and Regulation, in Denver, Colo. (Apr. 7, 1988), entitled The Current
Trend in Utility Regulation: Utility Restructuring and the Rise of Independent Power
Producers, at 14-17.
36. The Act which established the basic jurisdiction division was comprised of two
major parts: 1) the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), and 2) the Federal
Power Act (FPA). The latter granted to the Federal Power Commission (FPC), now FERC,
authority over wholesale power and transmission transactions. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1988).
PUHCA established a complex regulatory regime for utility holding companies, to be
administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1988).
PUHCA was designed primarily to curb a series of corporate abuses resulting from utility
holding company structures that were perceived as causing a variety of problems for
investors, consumers, and state regulators. 15 U.S.C. § 79(a) (1988). These abuses induded
the pyramiding of holding company structures and excessive debt-leveraging. See U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, PROPOSALS TO AMEND OR R.PEAL THE PUBLIC
UTILnTY HOLDING COMPANY Acr OF 1935, 14 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 SEC STATEMENT].
The 1935 Act divided federal regulatory authority between the SEC and FERC
along the following broad lines. The SEC regulates the activities of the holding companies
themselves, especially financial transactions and corporate structure, and certain of their
436
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to explain the increase in tensions between state and federal
regulators in the 1980s, and to make sense of a series of agency
and court decisions that have not adequately resolved a number of
jurisdictional conflicts. Understanding these tensions is crucial in
developing a rational approach to regulatory reform. 7
The first model described is the "single state rate base model."
The second is the "multistate integration model." A brief history
of the development of the regulatory structure and the legislative
framework designed to reconcile the diverse perspectives inherent
in these models is necessary to analyze the breakdown in that
structure that occurred in the 1980s.
1. The Single-State Rate Base Model
.Municipal governments were the first to regulate electric utilities;
their regulatory efforts began in the 1890s. In the opening decade
of the 20th century, a coalition of progressive reformers and
industry leaders 8 successfully urged state legislators to preempt
municipal control over investor-owned utilities (IOUs).s3 This
legislation was designed to avoid the conflicting and excessively
politicized local regulation that previously existed. By the mid-1920s,
most utilities were operating under a state-sanctioned monopoly
retail franchise with a general obligation to provide end-use service.
affiliate relationships. The FERC regulates the wholesale power and transmission transactions
of the operating utility subsidiaries (and state PUCs regulate certain of their retail
transactions). However, both FERC and many state PUCs regulate operating utility
corporate and financial matters. There is some potential for overlap and conflict over
jurisdiction. The FPA attempts to deal with this potential by requiring that, if a "person"
is subject to both PUHCA and FPA requirements "with respect to the same subject matter,"
only the former shall apply (unless the SEC has exempted that person from the
requirements of PUHCA, in which case only the FPA shall apply). 16 U.S.C. § 825q (1988).
37. See Vince & Moot, supra note 1; articles cited infra notes 113, 126.
38. See F. MCDONALD, INSULL (1962). This book describes the role played by utility
executives, especially Samuel Insull, President of Commonwealth Edison, and controlling
forces in several other utilities, in supporting the creation of state utility commissions.
39. The focus of this Section is upon the economic regulation of IOUs, which
account for dose to 80% of electric power sold in the United States. The Section does not
deal with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which is accountable directly to Congress
and is essentially unregulated; the federal power marketing agencies, which are regulated
in a limited fashion by the FERC and overseen by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE);
the approximately 1,800 state municipal or local publicly-owned utilities; and the
approximately 900 Rural Electrification Act (REA) cooperative utilities. See FERC TTF
REPORT, supra note 22, at 32. The last two groups of utilities are not subject to FERC
regulation (with one exception). See FPA §201(), 16 USC § 824 (1988); and Arkansas Elec.
Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375 (1983). These municipal or
cooperative utilities are subject to state regulation in some states, but left unregulated in
others.
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They were accountable to state PUCs who represented the interests
of the state ratepayers.' This model of regulation thus recognized
the natural monopoly characteristics in the electricity supply
process."
Almost from their inception, state PUCs began to rely on a "rate
base" model of economic regulation. This ratemaking model
identifies the utility system's actual or projected costs of providing
service for the period in question, adds a reasonable rate of return
on assets used to produce the regulated service rate base, and
determines a total revenue requirement. If another state's retail, or
FERC's wholesale, jurisdiction is involved, regulators allocate this
revenue requirement among the separate jurisdictions. Each
jurisdiction's share is then further allocated amongst its customer
classes. Regulators then establish prices, or rates, to recover the
revenue requirement allocated to each class. This process, described
in somewhat simplified form, is called rate base regulation through-
out this Artide.
As new generation and transmission technology made inter-utility
and interstate transactions common, state regulators began to assert
direct jurisdiction over these sales to control local IOUs' activities
effectively. The Supreme Court first addressed a constitutional
challenge to such assertions in Public Utility Commission v. Attleboro
Steam & Electric Co." The Court held that state control over
interstate wholesale transactions imposed a direct burden on national
commerce, in violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. 3 Two related concerns drove the Court: (1) the potential for
parochialism, and (2) the possibility of conflicting PUC determina-
40. The same structure exists today. Forty-nine states have PUCs that follow this
model of regulation. The sole exception, Nebraska, has no IOUs to regulate as all its
utilities are public power or rural cooperative entities. In a few cases, such as New Orleans,
municipalities complement or locally supplant the state commission.
41. However, because most of the industry entities involved were providing
integrated service, this model did not seek to identify which natural monopoly charac-
teristics exist in each of the three broad functions of that service-generation, transmis-
sion, and distribution. This failure has served to confuse the current reform debate, much
of which is driven by a perception that generation is not a natural monopoly function.
42. 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
43. In Attleboro, the Rhode Island PUC had upheld a rate filed by an instate utility
which altered the terms of a 20-year contract to fulfill all the power needs of a Mas-
sachusetts utility. In this case, it was the purchasing utility's challenge to the Rhode Island
PUC's upholding of a rate increase which interrupted a long-term contract in mid-course.
The Court implicitly recognized the potential bias involved when Rhode Island administra-
tive and judicial decisionmakers protected the interests of the instate utility and, indirectly,
the instate ratepayers at the expense of out-of-state interests. The Court also explicitly
recognized the potential of a conflicting Massachusetts PUC determination. Id. at 90.
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tions. Both concerns justified eliminating state jurisdiction over
interstate wholesale power transactions on Commerce Clause
grounds." By analogizing to a series of Commerce Clause cases
concerning state regulation of natural gas, the Court also incor-
porated a wholesale/retail transaction dichotomy as the proper basis
for distinguishing when state regulation would unduly burden
interstate commerce.45 By limiting the ability of states to regulate
interstate utility transactions, this decision created a regulatory gap.
These interstate wholesale transactions purportedly required some
economic regulation if retail ratepayers were to be protected from
the monopoly power of the utility; yet, state regulation was forbid-
den under the Constitution. The underlying assumption was that
economic regulation was the only available means to protect retail
ratepayers; wholesale competition apparently was not considered to
be an acceptable alternative.'
Congress moved to fill this regulatory void by enacting Part II
of the Federal Power Act of 1935 (FPA) 7 In the FPA, Congress
gave the Federal Power Commission (FPC), now FERC," broad au-
thority"4 to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of service for
the "transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the
sale of such energy in interstate commerce."50 The Commission was
also given broad, but not exclusive, authority to regulate various
aspects of utility corporate, financial, and accounting matters.5
Nevertheless, Congress also intended to preserve the existing scope
44. Ironically, when the Court revisited the Attleboro decision 56 years later, it found
the Commerce Clause reasoning in Attkboro dated and inappropriate, and it concluded that
PUCs could regulate the wholesale transactions of REA co-ops, which were not covered by
the Federal Power Act's preemptive provisions, nor preempted by the Rural Electrification
Act itself. Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 461 U.S. 375
(1983).
45. F.P.C. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964). This case is often
called the "City of Colton case," derived from the name of the municipal utility involved.
46. Note, however, that Justice Brandeis, in a dissent in Atueboro, recognized the
ability of Congress through "silence" to command that the ". . . utility shall remain free
from public regulation." Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Co., 273 U.S. 83, 91 (1927).
47. Federal Power Act (FPA), Tit. II, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 838 (1935)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1988)).
48. In 1977, the agency was renamed and formally made part of the U.S.
Department of Energy, but retained most of the FPC's regulatory authority (and, as it
turned out, its "independence") and acquired additional responsibilities. Department of
Energy Organization Act, §§ 204, 401-407, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7134, 7171-77.
49. The FPC had been established in 1920 to administer Part I of the FPA which
deals with hydropower licensees. Federal Water Power Act, Pub. L No. 66-280, 41 Stat.
1063 (1920) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 791 (1988)).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a), (d), (e) (1988).
51. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b), (c), (g), 825, 825(a), (c), (d) (1988).
439
Yale Journal on Regulation
of state authority, stating generally that the FPC's authority should
extend only to those matters that are not subject to regulation by
the States," and by specifically limiting the Commission's jurisdiction
to interstate transmission transactions. 3  This latter provision
preserved state jurisdiction over generating plants, as well as over
transmission facilities. Furthermore, transactions to transmit electricity
"consumed wholly by the transmitter remained subject to state
regulation.""
This effort to preserve the then-existing scope of state regulation
was reinforced by the other major component of the 1935 Act, the
Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA)' 5 Prior to this
legislation, the effectiveness of state PUCs apparently had been
undermined by the inability of PUCs to penetrate complex holding
company structures and by legal prohibitions against state control of
the relationship between parent companies and their state-regulated
subsidiaries.- PUHCA was successful in restoring the effectiveness of
state PUCs in the ensuing years. Today, PUCs are a powerful
regulatory force in most states, and their national body, the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), is a
powerful force in molding national policy.
In taking such obvious pains to protect state regulation in 1935,
Congress appeared to be conscious of the increasing potential for
federal authority to preempt state jurisdiction. The FPA thus
protected state regulation by a structural division of authority. States
would control all retail transactions and most generation and
transmission plant certification and citing decisions, while the federal
agency would regulate all wholesale transactions in interstate
commerce. In filling the Attleboro gap, the FPA attempted to preserve
the effectiveness of state jurisdiction by drawing a clear or "bright
line" between state and federal jurisdiction. 7
Throughout the 1950s, technological advances led to an
increasingly interconnected and interstate electric utility system,
which began to exert pressure on the single-state regulatory model.
One change producing such pressure was a greatly increased level
52. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1988).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1988).
54. Id.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1988).
56. Id.
57. FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964). As discussed below,
that line is considerably less dear in corporate structure and financial regulation.
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of coordination transactions among IOUs," which intensified in the
1960s, and continued into the 1970s.59 State regulators initially
responded to the emergence of these interconnected, multistate
utilities by conceptually dividing these utilities into parts. They
allocated revenue requirements and sometimes costs and assets
among jurisdictions and treated the allocated sums as if each were
a single-state utility. Ambiguous state laws that used the term "public
utility" in one sentence to mean a legal entity, in the next to mean
a subset of its assets, and in the next sentence to mean a subset of
that entity's costs, accommodated such regulatory practices."
Furthermore, most major multistate utilities, which were often
created by mergers of single-state utilities, found it convenient to
preserve the facade of single-state regulation by retaining operating
companies identifiable with single states, usually under a holding
company structure.6 '
Hence, the single-state rate base model of regulation was kept
intact for several decades, at least in form, even in the face of
technological changes that were slowly undermining the economic
and organizational justifications for such a model. That facade began
58. Such transactions range from short-term buying and selling of power to
formalized agreements amongst groups of utilities, commonly called "power pools." Utilities
design power pools to assure greater economy in and reliability of supply through reserve
sharing, joint planning, coordinated operations, and even joint ownership of generation and
transmission facilities. See generally FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, POWER POOLING
IN THE UNITED STATES 2-14 (1981) [hereinafter FERC POWER POOLING REPORT]. By 1989,
FERC regulated about 38% of all the kilowatt-hour (kwh) sales regulated in the country.
FERC TTF REPORT, supra note 22, at 16-20.
59. For example, the share of the nation's generating capacity accounted for by
power pools of unaffiliated utilities rose from 12% in 1960 to 50% in 1970. Id. at 9. The
courts have generally responded to these trends toward interconnection by finding that most
power flows on interconnected alternating current (AC) transmission grids are "in interstate
commerce," see infra Part 1, Section C, and that even contractually intrastate wholesale
transactions are therefore subject to exclusive FPC (FERC) jurisdiction. FPC v. Southern
Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964).
60. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 401 (1988).
61. Good examples are the Middle South Utilities and American Electric Power
holding company systems. The Middle-South System includes four operating utilities, two
operating exclusively in Louisiana, one exclusively in Mississippi and one predominantly in
Arkansas (with some operations in Missouri).
These systems still cling to the myth of self-sufficient single-state operating
companies, theoretically accountable to their respective PUCs. The notion of self-sufficiency
is preserved through equalization requirements in their system agreements that require each
subsidiary, over time, to build to meet its native capacity needs. Under the economic
pressures of the 1970s and 1980s, that mandate has become increasingly difficult to meet,
resulting in protracted differences in capacity reserves and significant differences in average
capacity costs.
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to crumble under the intensified economic pressures on the industry
in the 1980s."
2. The Multistate Integration Model
The language of the FPA also supports a very different model
of regulation. Congress built into the FPA a series of regulatory
mandates requiring FERC to encourage coordination and efficiency-
enhancing integration between utility systems.' This mandate
includes a general provision to "promote and encourage" the
"voluntary interconnection and coordination of facilities for the
generation, transmission and sale of electric energy."" The purpose
of this grant of power is to assure "an abundant supply of electric
energy throughout the United States with the greatest possible
economy and with regard to the proper utilization and conservation
of natural resources."' The Commission is also given authority in
certain limited circumstances to order interconnections between,6 and
the wheeling of energy over, utility systems. 7
The increasingly intersystem and interstate nature of the industry
is also manifest in the regulatory response to the 1965 blackout of
the Northeast as a result of failures in the interconnected transmis-
sion network. In the public furor that followed the blackout, the
FPC was directed to analyze the failure and propose methods for
avoiding a similar failure in the future. Rather than developing a
new form of federal regulation, the FPC accepted industry proposals
and recommended the establishment 6f nine industry-run regional
Reliability Councils. The Councils would allow the industry to
cooperate in maintaining the reliability of interconnected operations
and the adequacy of regional supplies.' In addition, the industry
established, in 1968, the North American Electric Reliability Council
(NERC) to aid in coordination among the regional councils. 69 Hence,
a form of industry self-regulation was instituted in lieu of potential
62. See infra Part 1, Section C.
63. Some of these functions were transferred to the U.S. Department of Energy.
See supra note 48. However, the broad jurisdiction of the Federal government to carry out
these mandates remains intact. In fact, it has been subsequently enhanced. See infra note
78 and accompanying text.
64. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1988).
65. Id.
66. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a(b), 824i (1988).
67. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j, 824k (1988). Wheeling is the use of one utility system's
transmission facilities to transmit power produced by another utility to a third party.
68. FERC POWER POOUNG REPORr, supra note 58, at 3.
69. FERC POWER POOL.ING RE PoR, supra note 58, at 2, 7.
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federal regulation to establish the technological rules-of-the-road for
the interconnected utility systems.
While this Reliability Council structure has viewed its mandate
as confined to assuring technical reliability, ° its importance as a self-
regulator has grown as wholesale markets have become more
competitive. Moreover, the dichotomy between technical and
economic objectives that NERC and the regional Reliability Coun-
cils have sought to maintain is not easily sustained. For instance,
NERC typically establishes standards for utility reserve margins7 to
meet accepted technical standards for reliability of supply. The
appropriate level of reserves, however, may be central to a state
PUC's determination as to how much utility plant should be in the
rate base and hence should earn a return for the utility. Thus, the
technological definition has large economic and regulatory conse-
quences. Furthermore, recent indications suggest that FERC is
starting to view issues such as the appropriate reserve margin as
pertinent to its review of multistate holding company agreements. 2
These developments portend a further blurring of traditional
regulatory roles that Congress sought to keep distinct.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, FERC also used its powers to
encourage the development of power pools and other forms of non-
market integration.3 In fact, the statutory provisions adopting a
multistate perspective suggest an integrated regional utility approach
to planning, building, and operating capacity that pays little regard
to state boundaries. This paradigm is a reality in most interstate
utility systems. 74 As major mergers continue, the list of such systems
70. See NORTH AMERICAN ELEC. RELIABILI'Y COUNCIL, 1989 RELABILITY
ASSESSMENT 2 (1989). Cf. Wilkinson, Power Monopolies and the Challenge of the Market:
American Theory and British Practice (Sept. 1989) (Discussion Paper E-89-12, Energy and
Environmental Policy Center, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University),
at n.67 ("The outcry after the blackout of US northeastern states in 1965 and the New
York blackout of 1975, and the political recriminations surrounding the U.K. blackouts of
the 1960s, taught utility managers to eiT on the side of caution when considering the trade-
off between cost and reliability. To justify' this caution, reliability appears after to have been
elevated from the realm of economics to the spheres of morality").
71. Reserve margins refers to the percentage by which the dependable generating
capacity available to a utility exceeds its projected peak capacity requirements. Typically,
certain levels of reserve are sought to provide a safeguard against unintended incapacita-
tion or isolation of generation sources.
72. Central and South West Services, Inc., 48 FERC 61,197 at 61,731-34 (1989).
73. See, e.g., FERC POWER POOLING REPORT, supra note 58, at 3-4.
74. Id. Two common organizational forms that facilitate behavior in accordance with
this paradigm are holding companies and multidivisional companies. While decisionmaking
and operations may be essentially similar for these two, the decision to structure themselves
as holding companies or as single corporate entities operating through various divisions
makes a dramatic difference in their jurisdictional status. The former typically must be
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will grow. 75 These statutory provisions providing for greater interstate
coordination were central to FERC's conclusion that state PUGs
could not perform "prudence review" of the supply decisions of
multistate holding companies and their operating subsidiaries. 6 In
the 1980s, these decisions increased state/federal tensions and often
required judicial intervention."
Hence, in the 1980s, FERC interpreted the FPA as requiring
greater coordination and limits on state authority that interfere with
efficient inter-utility coordination and integration.78 In some con-
troversial and bitterly contested cases, the FERC exercised its
preemptive authority to carry out its perceived mandates over strong
protest from state PUCs. 79 The multistate holding company cases are
registered and falls under the web of SEC regulation under PUHCA as well as some FERC
and PUG regulation. See supra note 36. The latter typically are regulated solely under the
FPA dichotomy between PUC and FERC jurisdictions.
75. The recent merger of Pacificorp and Utah Power & Light produced a single
utility with significant operations in seven states. Utah Power & Light Co., 45 FERC 1
61,095 (1988), order on reh'g., 47 FERC 1 61,209 (1989).
76. AEP Service Corp., 32 FERC 1 61,363 (1985); Kentucky Power Co., 36 FERC
1 61,227 (1986); Middle South Service, Inc., 31 FERC 1 61,305 (1.985), 808 F.2d 525 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). "Prudence review" typically involves an ex post facto PUC determination as to
whether utility expenses were prudently incurred so as to justify their recovery in retail
rates.
77. See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
78. In 1978, the Congress reaffirmed FERC's mandate to encourage efficiency-
furthering coordination by enacting, as part of the multifaceted National Energy Act
("NEA"), Section 205 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"), Pub.
L. No. 95-617, § 205 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at.16 U.S.C. §824a-1 (1988)). This Section
gives FERC authority to "exempt electric utilities, in whole or in part, from any provision
of State law, or from any State rule or regulation, which prohibits or prevents the voluntary
coordination of electric utilities including ...central dispatch." Id. (Emphasis provided.)
"Central dispatch" is an operational procedure whereby outputs of a set of generating units
are controlled to meet time-sensitive demands at minimum costs. FERC may exercise this
authority if it "determines that such voluntary coordination is designed to obtain economical
utilization of facilities and resources in any area." Id. Section 205 of PURPA is remarkable
in that it overtly grants to FERC authority, arguably implicit in some of FERC's general
coordination mandates in the FPA, to reach over the "bright line" and nullify traditional
areas of state authority in order to meet the coordination goal of encouraging power pools.
In fact, FERC has not exercised this authority to date. Any effort to do so would
undoubtedly be controversial. FERC's refusal to exercise its "§ 205 authority" may be
attributed to its focus in the 1980s on expanding competition in wholesale markets rather
than on expanding power pools. FERCs may be reluctant to exercise its full authority
because FERC appears to have found sufficient authority in the FPA to meet its
coordination goals to date. However, as the technology of transmission and control
advances, the emphasis on expanding power pools that was so prevalent in the 1960s and
1970s may return. This would increase the probability that Section 205 will be used.
Moreover, there are increasing signs of tensions within certain power pools (some of them
caused by state PUC concerns) that could threaten their existence and hence might induce
FERC to use its Section 205 authority. See, e.g., Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 46
FERC 1 61,419 (1989).
79. See infra notes 126, 128.
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the most renowned examples. 0 Another important example, which
may be a precursor to future trends in state/federal tensions, is the
FERC's 1988 decision in Utah Power & Light, which conditions a
merger between two utilities on their willingness to provide
transmission services to potential competitors.8' That decision was
also perceived by some as interfering with state prerogatives.
82
B. Policing the Bright Line: The Erosion of the Rate Base Model and
of the raditional Jurisdictional Dichotomy
In the years between enactment of the 1935 Public Utilities Act
and the late 1960s, the two models of regulation built into the FPA
coexisted comfortably. The combination of declining real production
costs,8" the strong monopoly power of vertically integrated utilities,
and a stable economic environment where input prices and final
demand remained constant for long periods of time, all provided the
necessary conditions for this regulatory system to work effectively.
These conditions produced increasingly comprehensive and reliable
service at declining overall costs."
Through the 1950s and 1960s, productivity growth in the electric
utility sector was consistently above the national inflation rate. As a
result, utilities rarely requested rate increases. Although regulators
occasionally demanded price decreases, they usually were satisfied to
allow utilities to determine which prices were to be reduced the
most. Utilities used this price flexibility to lower the rates charged
to price sensitive industrial customers. This policy increased overall
demand and allowed all customers to benefit from the economies
of scale associated with larger power plants. Since new technology
was lowering production costs, the utilities with the highest growth
80. See cases dted supra note 76.
81. Utah Power & Light Co., 45 FERC 61, 095 (1988). See infra Section E.3.
82. Id. In the merger review area, the FERC and affected PUCs with review
authority have concurrent jurisdiction, giving each the effective power to veto a proposed
merger. See infra Section E.3.
83. In 1987, on a national average, generation investments accounted for 60% of
total utility investment while transmission investment accounted for about 12%. FERC TTF
REPORT, supra note 22, at 59-60. However, the individual percentages for generation and
transmission can vary quite dramatically on individual utility systems.
84. Stated in 1984 dollars, the national average real price of electricity declined
from 17.8 cents in 1929 to 4.0 cents per kilowatt-hour (KWH) in 1970, due principally to
technological advances in thermal efficiency, increased coordination, and economies of scale
in generation. Between 1970 and 1984, that real price rose to 6.2 cents per KWH, more
than a 50% increase. Remarks by Jerry D. Geist, Chairman and President, Public Service
Company of New Mexico, Chairman, Edison Electric Institute, 55th Annual EEI Convention,
in Cincinnati, Ohio (June 8, 1987) (entitled Place Your Bets: Three Paths to the Future).
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rates could incorporate the new technology most rapidly. Conse-
quently, price reductions led to growth in quantity demanded, which
led to further cost dedines and the possibility of even more price
reductions.
These steady real cost reductions masked the serious pricing
flaws inherent in traditional rate-of-return regulation. Industrial
customers who had other supply options usually were the benefici-
aries of a pricing model that discriminated in their favor. As a result,
they tolerated a system of regulation that occasionally overpriced
services, confident that regulators would soon lower prices once
again.
1. Volatile Input Prices and Altered Patterns of Final Demand
This virtuous cycle began to turn vicious in the late 1960s, partly
as a consequence of macroeconomic developments outside utility
control. Those developments included the OPEC oil shocks of 1974
and 1979, and the resultant increase in the rate of inflation, as well
as a general decline in the rate of productivity growth. In addition,
utility construction costs were pushed up by increasing environmental
concerns and historically high interest rates. New plants became
expensive in both real and nominal terms. With inflation outrunning
productivity and newer plants entering the rate base at nominal costs
above that of older plants, utilities were required repeatedly to
request state PUC approval for price increases. Since formal PUC
pricing proceedings mobilized political forces to protest the price
increases, the utilities began to lose control of rate design and the
ability to price discriminate. As a result of these changes, maintaining
high capacity growth rates ceased to be a widely held utility
objective. In fact, utility planners adopted the opposite goal: zero
or negative growth. In this environment, demand-side incentives and
load management became slogans to describe methods for lowering
growth rates.
Although some of these economic forces affecting utility capacity
planning probably will prove to be temporary, others will be
permanent. Several factors are particularly likely to have a sustained
impact. For example, beginning in the 1970s the global economy
grew increasingly interdependent with both energy prices 5 and
85. Domestic oil and natural gas prices have been determined largely by world oil
prices since the deregulation of oil production prices in 1980s. See PURPA, Oversight
Hearings beore the Sen. Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13
(1988) (testimony of Charles G. Stalon) [hereinafter Stalon testimony], reprinted in COMPnTi-
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interest rates being determined in volatile international markets.
Furthermore, increased international competition has reduced the
electricity demands of many traditional industrial customers.1
6
Conversely, rising electricity costs have undermined the international
competitiveness of industries heavily dependent on electricity and
intensified their need to find other supply options. As a result,
regulators can no longer set prices independently of demand
conditions.
Another relatively long-term force affecting the industry stems
from the late 1960s, when the general macroeconomic policy of the
United States changed from one that had favored relatively low real
interest rates to one favoring higher rates.8 7 This change decreased
the financial attractiveness of the long-gestation, capital-intensive
generating plants that had dominated utility capacity expansions
through the 1960s. This change in interest rate policy has fun-
damentally altered industry economics and sharply reduced the
numbers of large baseload generating units constructed since the late
1970s."
Furthermore, the increasingly deep business cycles that have
followed the first OPEC price shock also have undermined planning
in the industry.89 The resulting unpredictable patterns of demand
create special problems for electric utilities with highly-leveraged
capital structures and long lead times for completing major baseload
units.'0 By the 1980s, forecasting failures had led utilities to build far
TION IN ELECmcIrY: NEW MARKXE's AND NEW SmIUcG'URS 319-60 (J. Plummer & S.
Troppmann eds. 1990).
86. Electricity can comprise up to three quarters of the total costs of production
in some industrial enterprises, such as those in the air products industry. See Electricity
Consumers Resource Council (ELCON), 34 ELCON Report (1986).
87. Moody's Aaa corporate bond rates that averaged 2.72% in the 1940s, 3.30% in
the 1950s, and 4.35% in the first half of the 1960s, increased to 5.67% in the last half of
the 1960s, to 8.29% in the 1970s and 12.93% in the first half of the 1980s. This rate fell
to 11.37 and 9.02% in 1985 and 1986 respectively. ECONOMIC RF.PORT OF THE PRESIDENT
324 (1987). By June of 1987 this rate had risen to 9.32%. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
ADVISERS, ECONOMIC INDICATORS 30 (July 1987).
88. See supra note 25.
89. Stalon testimony. supra note 85, at 11-12. The sustained expansion of the last
several years may signal the end of this concern, but only an optimist would predict that
the U.S. experience from World War II to 1973 is likely to be matched in the next 25
years. The U.S. record of not efficiently adjusting to shocks from the international economy
makes it difficult to maintain such optimism.
90. Id.
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more costly baseload capacity than they needed." In the 1990s,
utilities may underestimate actual demand growth thereby producing
a supply shortfall.
2. Regulatory Breakdowns
Traditional rate-of-return regulation proved inadequate to deal
with these changing economic circumstances. Not only did regu-
lators fail to establish prices that reflected differentiated demand
conditions, they also produced a utility revenue recovery pattern
unable to adapt to external economic realities. Perhaps the most
poignant example of this rigidity is the front-loading of capital cost
recovery that occurred under the traditional regulatory approach.
This approach sets relatively high prices when a plant is new and
relatively low prices when the plant is older.9" Hence, when the
economy was in recession in the early 1980s, and the older, energy-
intensive industrial sector was in trouble, many utilities were re-
questing historically high rate increases as new more expensive
units came into the rate base. 5 A new term, rate shock, entered
industry jargon. Moreover, given their financial condition, few
91. Much of the industry had planned for years on the basis of annual demand
growth projections that averaged about 7%. Because of the long lead times in planning
major generation plant additions, many utilities found that, by the late 1970s and early
1980s, they had planned for needs far in excess of actual demands. This led to costly
postponements or cancellations, or building into significant and costly excess capacity
situations. These developments were devastating to cost containment in an industry as
capital-intensive as electric power production.
92. Under that model, while depreciation of capital expended on a plant is "straight-
lined" over the projected life of the plant, the return on the undepreciated portion of the
capital in rate base declines each year as depreciation is booked.
93. Furthermore, these price changes tended to be demand perverse. When demand
falls, or fails to rise as forecasted, ceteris paribus, the model calls for price increases to cover
costs, especially the scheduled capital recovery. Conversely, when demand rises, or rises
more than expected, the model calls for lower prices as there are more units of output over
which to spread the revenue requirement determined by the scheduled capital recovery.
These price responses are, of course, the exact opposite of what economic efficiency
normally demands. See Stalon testimony, supra note 85, at 13-14.
94. Some proposed increases were massive, exceeding 50% or even 100% of existing
rates, sought either in a single rate case or in several cases "pancaked" over a few years.
For example, Commonwealth Edison Company requested a series of large, general rate
increases in the late 1970s and through the 1980s, resulting from the construction of six
new nuclear units. Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Commonwealth Edison Co., Dkt. Nos.
78-0045, 79-0214, 80-0546, 82-0026, 83-0537, 84-0555, 87-0043, 87-0427.
95. Indeed, absent some creative adjustments to capital cost recovery to avoid
extreme front-end loading of capital recovery, utilities not seeking full rate base recovery
on new units were at risk of permanently losing recovery or earnings under the model.
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utilities were willing to defer revenue increases until after the
recession, unless pressured to do so by state PUCs.
In response, some consumers, especially large, electricity-inten-
sive industrials, began to seek alternate supply options.96 Many
industrials were able to plausibly propose self-generation, always a
theoretical option,9 and one rendered considerably more viable by
Section 210 of PURPA.98 Some consumers also were able to switch
fuels, or bypass their traditional supplier by obtaining transmission
access to another utility.9 Other consumers threatened to close plants
in the service territories of utilities that raised prices until more
favorable terms could be negotiated."°°
Hence, state PUCs confronted a number of utility proposals that
would have increased rates dramatically and that threatened to drive
some consumers off utility systems, necessitating, under the tradition-
al model, raising rates for remaining customers even more (the so-
called "death spiral" effect). Some utility proposals were based upon
costly generation capacity additions that would create considerable
excess capacity in the near term. Other proposals reflected costs
incurred for units cancelled because of declining demand and high
construction costs. Confronted with industrial customers threatening
to self-generate or shift production, state PUCs frequently reacted by
intensifying their review of the prudence and usefulness of utility
96. Most industrial consumers have a traditional utility supplier within whose "service
territory" they lie and upon whose transmission grid they typically rely upon to receive
power.
97. On-site industrial generation represented 58% of total U.S. generation in 1900,
but had dropped to 4% of total U.S. generation in 1974. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
COGENERATON: TEcHNICAL CONCEPTs, TRENDS, PRosPEcrs 22 (1978).
98. Section 210 established regulatory guarantees that qualifying cogeneration or
"small power production" facilities (QFs) would have a market for their surplus power. 16
U.S.C. § 824a-3(a), (b) (1988). Cogeneration is the joint, sequential production of both
electricity and steam or some other useful energy form. 16 U.S.C. § 796(18)(A) (Supp.
1989). "Small power production facilities" are those whose maximum generating capacity
does not exceed 80 megawatts and which use biomass, waste or "renewable resources" to
produce electricity. 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(A) (1988). For a comprehensive description of the
Section 210 regulatory scheme, see Lock, Encouraging Decenraized Generation of Electricity:
Implementation of the New Statutory Scheme, 2 SOLAR L. REP. 705 (1980). More important,
Section 210 assured QFs that they could receive "backup" or supplementary power from
their native utility at reasonable prices should the QF prove unable to meet its consumption
needs. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a), (c) (1988).
99. "Bypass" is also a major and controversial issue in natural gas regulation and
a major concern to state PUCs in that arena. See infra Part 1I.
100. See Remarks by John A. Anderson, Electricity Consumer's Reserve Council
(ELCON) Regulation Conference, at Iowa State University (May 20, 1987), at 17-18.
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investments.' 0 Other states responded to these developments by
exercising an increasingly active ex-ante role in utility capacity
planning decisions. For example, some state PUCs turned tradition-
ally uncontroversial need for power certification proceedings for new
plants into active reviews of utility supply plans, while others created
new state planning mechanisms by statute.0 2 In addition, state
regulators recently have begun to modernize their oversight of
procurement practices through the imposition of least cost planning
requirements and competitive bidding schemes. 03 State regulators
also have emphasized demand-side measures such as conservation,
load management, and marginal cost pricing.
Another consequence of the large rate increases and attendant
conservation responses of the 1970s and 1980s, and of expanded
supply options for industrial customers, was a weakening of the
franchise utility's distribution monopoly. Utilities were no longer
able to pass cost increases on to traditionally captive core retail and
wholesale customers without concern about the impact of rate
increases on the quantity demanded. Price elasticities proved to be
larger than utilities expected. Hence, state PUCs were less able to
use their distribution monopoly power to achieve various social
objectives that added taxes onto rates. Nor could they sustain certain
cost-subsidies in rates. Moreover, increasing competition in wholesale
markets threatened the market shares of utilities with escalating rates
and made more obvious to PUCs and consumers the high cost of
their retail service.'"
3. Balancing Federal and State Regulatory Concerns
This growing state role in utility planning has occurred in the
midst of the industry's continued trend towards greater intersystem
and interstate cooperation. Indeed, the rapid growth of the
101. See Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Cancelled Plants and
Excess Capacity, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 497 (1984) (analyzing PUC review standards in context
of economic changes in industry).
102. For an early but comprehensive review of such PUC actions, see ABA SPECIAL
COMM. ON ENERGY LAW, THE NEED FOR POWER AND CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGIES: STATE
DECISIONS ON ELEGRIC POWER FACILITIES (1981). This study surveyed the process for
review of utility power supply planning in all fifty states and conducted a detailed case
study of two states (California and Illinois). It drew some policy conclusions and made
some general recommendations.
103. The term "least cost" planning is based in part upon concepts developed by R.
SANT, THE LLAsr-COSr ENERGY SrRATEGY: MINIMIZING CONSUMER COsT THROUGH
COMPETITION (1979).
104. See generally Stalon testimony, supra note 85.
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wholesale power market, primarily among IOUs, also was driven in
large part by the industry's economic problems. Major power supply
acquisitions, traditionally achieved by utilities building new plants
under direct state supervision, were now being made through
wholesale purchases. This switch gave FERC the exclusive authority
under the FPA to pass upon the reasonableness of such wholesale
prices. Narragansett Electric Co. v. Burke held that a state PUC could
not investigate the reasonableness of the costs underlying a wholesale
rate approved by FERC.' °5 Hence, under Narragansett, the PUC must
recognize the wholesale purchase as a cost item in retail rates. State
regulators were forced to balance the undesirability of losing jurisdic-
tion over local utilities that purchased from neighboring utilities
against the increased risks associated with utilities' building their
own capacity to meet local needs.
Unqualified, the Narragansett doctrine would have put serious
constraints on the effectiveness of state regulation as wholesale
markets expanded. However, limitations on the scope of the
Narragansett doctrine were developed in a complementary doctrine
defined by FERC in a series of decisions' °6 and by a state court in
Pike County Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Utility Commission."°7 The
Pike County doctrine holds that, while a PUC may not question the
reasonableness of the selling utility's cost structure without violating
Narragansett, it may question the prudence of the purchase decision
by the buyer, at least in the light of other power acquisition op-
tions.10s
Hence, in response to a major challenge to state authority in
implementing or policing the FPA bright line, FERC and the state
courts established another dichotomy. This new dichotomy was based
upon the perceived difference in function between FERC and the
PUCs in monitoring wholesale power transactions. While the
increasing role assumed by states in monitoring ex-ante utility
105. Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 119 R.I. 559, 381 A.2d 1358 (1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 972 (1978). For a description of the Narragansett case, its context and its progeny,
see Vince & Moot, supra note 1, at 17-20. The Narragansett doctrine subsequently has been
endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476
U.S. 953 (1986). Mississippi Power & light Co. v. Moore, 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1988).
106. Monongahela Power Co., 39 FERC 61,350 (1987); Pacific Power & light Co.,
27 FERC 61,080 (1984); Southern Co. Seres., 26 FERC 61,360 (1984); Pennsylvania
Power & Light Co., 23 FERC 61,006 (1983), reh'g denied, 23 FERC 61,325 (1983);
Southern Co. Servs., 20 FERC 1 61,332 (1982); 15 FERC 1 61,332 (1982); 15 FERC 1
61,264 (1982).
107. 77 Pa. Commw. 268, 465 A.2d 735 (1983).
108. Id. See also Monongahela Power Co., 39 FERC 1 61,350 (1987); Pennsylvania
Power & Light Co., 23 FERC 1 61,325 (1983).
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planning was not easy to reconcile with the rapid growth of
wholesale markets, the Narragansett/Pike Coutnty dichotomy seemed to
provide a workable accommodation between FERC and PUC
regulatory prerogatives.
However, when PUCs attempted to review the purchase decisions
of operating affiliates of multistate utility holding companies, the
Narragansett/Pike County dichotomy was shattered. In a series of
decisions relating to the allocation of costs among operating
subsidiaries of the Middle-South and American Electric Power
holding company systems, FERC limited the Pike County doctrine as
applied to multistate transactions." 9 FERC concluded that PUCs had
no authority to engage in prudence review or to impose disallowan-
ces on the pass-through of these costs into retail rates when FERC
allocated costs among multistate subsidiaries.110 FERC's determination
that the Pike County doctrine did not apply with respect to allocating
the costs of an expensive nuclear unit built by the Middle South
System caused a storm of protest that had to be resolved by the
Supreme Court in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Moore."' The
Supreme Court eventually upheld FERC's position, holding that
states may not review the prudence of FERC allocations of costs
among holding company subsidiaries."2
This Article will not analyze the various interpretations of the
Mississippi decision or its impact on the Narragansett/Pike County
dichotomy. That area has been intensely litigated and has received
wide attention from legal scholars." 3 Instead, this Section notes two
central strands of reasoning behind the FERC and Supreme Court
determinations that limit or preclude application of Pike County in
the multistate holding company situation:" 4
(1) Prudence review (a state PUC function under Pike County),
and cost allocation/interpretation of the system agreement
109. See AEP Service Corp., 32 FERC 61,363 (1985); Kentucky Power Co., 36 FERC
1 61,227 (1986); Middle South Energy, Inc., 31 FERC 61,305 (1985).
110. See cases cited supra note 109.
111. 108 S. CL 2428 (1988).
112. 108 S. CL at 2440.
113. See, e.g., Vince & Moot, supra note 1; Duffy, Will the Supreme Court Lose Patience
with Prudence? 9 ENERGY L.J. 83 (1988); Ercolano & Lesch, Narragansett Update: From
Washington Gas Light to Nantahala, 7 ENERGY L.J. 333 (1986); Hobelman, The Narragansett
Decision and Its Aftermath, 6 ENERGY L.J. 33 (1985); Nixon & Johnston, Nantahala Affirms
Narragansett--Whither Pike County? 8 ENERGY LJ. 1 (1987).
114. It is unclear whether Mississippi applies only to units built or purchases made
by the holding company system for its subsidiaries, and not to purchases by the subsidiaries
from nonaffiliate sources, or whether it covers the latter as well.
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(FERC functions under Narragansett), are so interrelated that
they cannot be separated. FERC expressed this view in the
American Electric Power (AEP) line of cases." 5 According to this
argument, FERC cannot meet its obligations to encourage
coordination through multistate power pools when states retain
the authority to review for prudence. Such review could
undermine power pool relationships altogether if states refuse
to pass through system-allocated costs. In AEP Service Corp.,
FERC also suggested that states would have no authority over
a utility's decision to join the holding company in the first
place."'
(2) Many of the FERC decisions," 7 and the Supreme Court
opinions in both Nantahala and Mississippi,"8 reasoned that
because FERC allocations of system power in these cases
required the purchase of certain quantities of power, the
operating subsidiaries had no legal choice but to make those
purchases. This reasoning negates application of the Pike County
doctrine, which implies some choice among purchase options."19
115. See AEP Service Corp., 32 FERC 61,363, at 61,818 (1985); AEP Generating
Co., 36 FERC 61,226 (1986). That view was explicitly recognized in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Brennan (Marshall and Blackman joining) [hereinafter Brennan dissent] in
Mississippi, 108 S. CL at 2445.
116. AEP Service Corp., 32 FERC 1 61,363, at 61,818. FERC based much of its
reasoning supporting this conclusion on the plenary control by the SEC over the formation
of holding companies under PUHCA. Id. Therefore, this conclusion may not carry over
to utility decisions to join unaffiliated power pools, although the logic suggests that it
should. The three dissenting judges in Misissipi based their dissent on strong disagreement
with these FERC positions, suggesting implicit majority support for them. That interpreta-
tion could be supported by the majority's references to the inadmissability of PUC
disallowances leading to a trapping of costs, i.e., the sum of the costs recognized in rates
by the states is less than the sum of the costs incurred by the utility. MissiPA 108 S. Ct.
2428, 2439 (1988). However, the majority probably would not have asserted that states
would have no authority over the initial decision to join the holding company pool; both
Mississippi and Nantahala (on which the majority relied heavily) involved allocations of costs
already incurred.
117. See, e.g., AEP Generating Co., 38 FERC 1 61,243 (1987), reh'g, 39 FERC 1
61,158 (1987).
118. Mississpi, 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1988); Natahala Power & Light v. Thornburg, 476
U.S. 953 (1986).
119. The Supreme Court appears to accept this logic. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. at 2439-
60. However, the logic is not flawless. Prudence review might meaningfully focus on
whether any capacity needs to be purchased at all, rendering the absence of other supply
options irrelevant.
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Despite a hint of circularity in this reasoning,20 this Article does not
challenge its legality. However, this rea-soning suggests that the
holding company systems are so centrally planned and controlled
that costs should be equalized among the operating subsidiaries. 2'
Yet, FERC has resisted this reasoning in its allocation decisions.
Moreover, the structures of most of the holding company systems,
including Middle South and AEP, still follow the single-state model
by partly preserving the notion of the self-sufficient operating
company accountable to its state commission's retail jurisdiction.
Again, FERC protected this notion in determining that each of AEP's
operating companies should build to meet its own capacity needs as
opposed to relying permanently on purchases from its corporate
siblings.1
22
C. The "Bright Line" Under Stress
Middle South Energy, Inc. and other multistate holding company
cases emanated from a direct conflict between the traditional
regulatory objectives of FERC and of the state PUCs. The conflict
had very little to do with emerging competition in the industry.
Rather, it became intense as the economic assumptions underlying
the traditional regulatory system broke down and state agencies felt
the need to impose ex-post-facto discipline on the planning decisions
of centrally planned holding company systems that had gone awry.
FERC, pursuing its statutory mandate, sought to protect mechanisms,
such as power pools and holding companies, designed to integrate
and coordinate those multistate systems. 2 ' This potential for conflict,
inherent in the traditional statutory structure, remains today. Indeed,
the conflict may intensify as states attempt to strengthen their control
over the utility supply planning process.
These multistate holding company disputes revolved around the
question of which state's ratepayers should bear the cost of
unneeded system capacity additions-in Middle South's case, an
120. See, e.g., Nixon & Johnston, supra note 113; see also Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 2445,
2448 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121. This logic led Judge Bork, in his partial dissent on the FERC's Grand Gulf
decisions, to question whether there should be production cost equalization across the
entire Middle South System. Mississippi Indus. v. FERC, 808 F.2d 1525, 1568-69 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). This notion (which the FERC had rejected) would have required a fundamental
reallocation of costs among the system's subsidiaries. See System Energy Resources, Inc.,
41 FERC 61,239 (1987).
122. AEP Generating Co. & Kentucky Power Co., 38 FERC 61,243, 61,821 (1987).
123. See cases cited supra note 109.
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expensive nuclear unit. The regional wholesale market was insuffi-
cient to absorb high-cost surplus capacity in order to reduce costs
allocated to ratepayers, and the traditional regulatory pricing system
only exacerbated the cost burden. 114 Furthermore, no effective
dispute resolution mechanism existed at the state level to resolve the
interstate conflict over the appropriate allocations of the cost
burdens. Hence, FERC was forced to resolve this dispute between
states in two fiercely contested proceedings.2 5 However, once FERC
interpreted the FPA as preempting the losing states from transfer-
ring the costs of the unneeded capacity from their ratepayers to the
multistate system's shareholders, the nature of the dispute became
state/federal.
As a policy matter, the legal result in Mississippi is unacceptable
to most states. 2 ' It leaves them in the frustrating position of having
to accept and pass through to their ratepayers substantial costs
resulting from planning decisions over which they have had virtually
no control. It also denies states that regulate subsidiaries of multi-
state companies the ability to influence utility supply planning, long
viewed as a fundamental state prerogative. Furthermore, the Court
did not decide whether the reasoning used in Mississippi extends to
power pools that include unaffiliated entities, especially those that
have achieved significant integration in planning and operation."2 If
states are concerned that utility participation in power pools may
deprive them of jurisdiction over power supply planning, they may
resist such participation, even when it enhances efficiency.2'
124. See supra note 93.
125. The Brennan dissent in Mississi pi explicidly recognizes the necessity of FERC
acting as the "neutral federal mediator." 108 S. Ct. at 2448.
126. For a trenchant presentation of state concerns, see Clinton, Johnston, Nixon,
& Bratton, FERC, State Regulators and Public Utilities: A Tilted Balance? NAT. RESOURCFS &
ENV'T, Spring 1987, at 11. See also Nixon & Johnston, supra note 113; Johnston, Nixon,
Copeland & Massey, Escape from the Black Hole of FERC: A Proposal to Restore Pike Prudence
Review, 2 ELECnICITY J. 12 (1989).
127. Another uncertainty is the exact scope of Mississippi within the multistate holding
company context itself. Does it extend to all purchase decisions by the holding -company
and its subsidiaries, or only to those "purchases" internal to the system or made externally
for the system as a whole?
128. See, eg., Address by Peter A. Bradford, Maine PUG Chairman, Seventeenth
Annual Conference of the Institute of Public Utilities, at Williamsburg, Va. (Dec. 9, 1985)
(entitled Brought to You by the Brewers of Narragansett: FERC, Middle South and State
Utility Regulation), reprinted in Public Untility Regulation in an Environment of Change,
MSU Public Utilities Papers (1982). In commenting upon FERC's Middle South allocation
decision, 31 FERC 61,305 (1985), Chairman Bradford observed: "I will certainly not allow
any actions by a Maine utility that might expose them to retroactive equalization of the sort
applied in the Middle South system. This may mean rejecting some otherwise attractive arrange-
ments." (emphasis added). See also, Johnston & Nixon, Full Preemption in Holding Company
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More generally, continuation of the policy impasse over juris-
diction may lead PUCs, fearing further loss of jurisdiction, to adopt
an unduly defensive posture with regard to efficiency-enhancing
utility restructuring proposals that accommodate new market
developments. Symptomatic of this danger, two PUCs rejected major
utility restructuring proposals that would have placed power
generation assets in separate corporations to compete more effective-
ly in the wholesale markets.2 9 Underlying this resistance is a general
fear of loss of jurisdiction to FERC and a concern that this loss can
result from a simple change in corporate form.'" Such concerns may
create a climate in which restructuring, especially vertical deintegra-
tion proposals, will be evaluated by states less on their potential
contribution to efficient electricity production and more on their
perceived effect on state jurisdiction.'3'
Finally, the two major Supreme Court cases on this issue to date
have cast doubt on the scope and viability of the Pike County
doctrine. While both Nantahala and Mississippi recognize the doctrine
in rather weak dicta,' neither found it applicable to the cases before
them. Nor were they dear as to exactly when it would apply. "' This
ambiguity has created concern among state PUCs that Pike County
will not provide adequate prudence review authority, even outside
of the holding company and power pool contexts. This concern has
led PUCs to focus attention upon codifying or expanding the Pike
County doctrine, perhaps as a precondition for any major legislative
reform initiative in the electric power area."4 Once again, arguably
Transactions-A Double Standard that Creates an Underclass of Consumers (August 11,
1987) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association, San Francisco California). Robert Johnston was Chairman of the Arkansas PUC
at the time of this speech.
129. See supra note 35.
130. See Nixon & Johnston, supra note 113.
131. Vertical deintegration of some IOUs may be an important element in creating
efficient wholesale power markets.
132. Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 972; Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. at 2440.
133. 476 U.S. at 972: 108 S. Ct. at 2440. Further doubt as to the viability of the
Nantahala/Pike County dichotomy may have been raised by a recent Court of Appeals decision
rejecting a FERC assertion of jurisdiction (vis-a-vis the SEC), based on a similar dichotomy,
over coal sales by affiliates to holding company utilities. Ohio Power Co. v. FERC, 880
F.2d 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
134. In July 1989, NARUC passed a resolution that expressed concerns about the
impact of Mississipi on the state prudence review function. The resolution also conditioned
removal of NARUC opposition to proposals to amend PUHCA upon inclusion of legislative
provisions that would, inter ai/a, codify a general Pike County doctrine. A second condition
proposed was a regional compact solution to the state review problem in multistate holding
company situations.
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legitimate PUG fears over loss of jurisdiction threaten to hamper and
distort necessary reform initiatives.
In conclusion, the legal result of Mississippi is not likely to resolve
the conflict over regulatory policy inherent in most multistate
disputes. Nor will it do much to ensure optimal state/federal
progress on regulatory reform. Given the ease with which utilities
can escape state prudence reviews by manipulating their corporate
form, and given the uncertain status of the Pike County doctrine,
states justifiably are concerned about jurisdictional issues. These
concerns could encourage some states to resist the development of
more efficient wholesale markets in order to limit FERC's jurisdiction
and preserve their own. Such an approach would not only reduce
efficiency, but also would undermine those very attempts to pre-
serve state jurisdiction in the long run by reinforcing some of the
inefficient features of the traditional regulatory system, such as
industrial bypass, that have weakened state regulation. Indeed, the
best long-term prospect for reducing end-use customer incentives
to bypass is to create an efficient inter-utility trading system that
will reduce the large differentials in average costs between supply
systems.
D. State and Federal Jurisdiction Over Transmission: An Emerging
Conflict?
The major disputes discussed above have focused upon state
authority to review utility decisions to build generation facilities or
to purchase power. Few state PUCs have reviewed the prudence of
transmission investments or service contracts. However, any effort to
analyze the evolution of state/federal jurisdictional relations in electric
utility regulation would be incomplete without noting an emerging
dialogue, if not yet a conflict, over jurisdiction in the transmission
area.
Jurisdiction over transmission is currently allocated between state
and federal agencies according to historical accident, rather than as
the result of a reasoned assignment of jurisdiction."5 States almost
exclusively regulate the certification and siting of transmission lines."
FERC, however, has jurisdiction over "the transmission of electric
135. Brown, The Balkan Revisite& A Modest Plan for Transmission Reform, 2 ELECTRICITY
J. 32 (1989).
136. See TRANSMISSION TASK FORCE, COMMITrIEE ON ENERGY AND ENV'T, NATYL
GOVERNORS' ASS'N, MOVING POWER: FLEXIBILITY FOR THE FUTuRE 9-14 (1987) [hereinafter
NGA TRANSMISSION REPORT].
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energy in interstate commerce."'37 The Supreme Court has inter-
preted this statutory mandate to give FERC exclusive and non-
delegable authority over the pricing of unbundled (separately
identifiable and priced) transmission service.' Yet, most revenues on
utility transmission investments are still recovered through bundled
state PUG retail rates for total service," 9 while others are recovered
in bundled FERC wholesale requirements rates. Similarly, only FERC
is explicitly granted authority to order utilities to provide wheeling
service, or transmission access to another utility.'40 However, the
findings necessary to make such an order are so formidable that
FERC has never exercised this authority.'4' States have no direct
authority to order wheeling under the federal statutes. Nevertheless,
some observers assert that states can mandate wheeling under their
general ratemaking and planning authorities.1 42 They also assert that
there are numerous less direct methods states can use, such as
conditioning a utility's transmission facility certifications on its
providing access, imputing revenues, or making rate base disallow-
ances for possible wheeling revenues foregone. 4 Although these state
actions may be preempted by the broad statutory authority granted
to FERC under the FPA, state assertions of authority are growing
rapidly and, so far, no court has resolved this issue.'"
The increased frequency of these assertions is closely related to
the increase in independent generation, especially the development
of QFs under Section 210 of PURPA, and in wholesale trading of
power among utilities. Transmission access is increasingly viewed as
a necessary ingredient in achieving efficient and competitive
wholesale bulk power markets.145 Many states appear to be ex-
ploring limited wheeling concepts similar to the wheeling in and
137. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1988).
138. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 340 (1982); FPC
v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 209 n.5, 216. (1964) (City of Colton); Florida
Power & Light Co., 29 FERC 61,140 (1984) (Florida Power 1).
139. The costs relating to all utility services provided including generation,
transmission, and distribution, are "bundled" into a single "revenue requirement" for
ratemaking purposes.
140. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j-k (1988).
141. See, e.g., Southeastern Power Admin. v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 25 FERC 61,204
(1983).
142. Brown, supra note 135, at 35.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., POWER SUPPLY PoucY GROUP, EDISON ELECTRIC INST., TRANSMISSION
AccESS AND WHEELING: A SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS (1989). This paper
reports that nine state PUCs have asserted jurisdiction to mandate wheeling and that 31
states are active in the area. Id. at 1.
145. See generally FERC ITF REPORT, supra note 22, at 170-76.
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wheeling out proposals in FERC's 1988 bidding NOPR.46 However,
because of the lack of federal initiative in defining access conditions,
most state PUCs appear to be proceeding without apparent concern
about the potential for preemption.
47
Ironically, it is in the pricing of unbundled transmission service,
where FERC's exclusive authority is clearest, that states have been
most actively exploring their ability to regulate. In Florida Power 1,'4
the Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC) sought a declaratory
order from FERC that the FPSC could establish a statewide rate for
the transmission of QF power 49 and, more obliquely, that it could
order the wheeling of QF power 5 0 FERC concluded that the FPSC
was preempted from establishing such a transmission rate, but FERC
did not address the state's authority to order wheeling.'' In Florida
Power II, the FPSC asked FERC to recognize a distinction between
the rate in a filed transmission tariff, which is subject to exclusive
FERC jurisdiction, and other terms and conditions of the service
provided, which, it argued, the FPSG could regulate.'52 FERG
rejected the distinction, noting that its exclusive jurisdiction under
the FPA extends to "terms and conditions" of service as well as to
the rates themselves. 5 ' FERG also concluded that, to delegate
authority over some of these terms and conditions to PUCs while
leaving others at FERC (a NARUG suggestion in the case) would
create the very sort of "overlap, confusion and potential for conflict"
that the FP~s bright line sought to avoid." In a related area, FERG
also declined a suggestion by the Ohio PUC that the FERC should
delegate to it the ability to rule upon a request to establish an
146. See supra note 144. The wheeling in proposal would condition a utility's
participation as a potential supplier in a competitive bidding procurement scheme upon
its providing wheeling service, if possible, to other potential suppliers in that scheme.
Wheeling out would entitle a supplier within the utility's service area that loses a bid to
wheel its power over that utility's transmission grid for sale elsewhere. Id. -at 32,043-46;
see also Stalon Testimony, supra note 85, at 49-50.
147. See sources cited supra note 144.
148. Florida Power & Light Co., 29 FERC 61,140 (1984).
149. "QF power" is that power generated by facilities qualifying under Section 210
of PURPA, such as cogeneration facilities. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-(3)(f) (1988).
150. The petition inquired whether FERC rules, with which the FPSC claimed its
rules were "consistent," required such wheeling. Florida Power & Light Co., 29 FERC
61,140 (1984).
151. 29 FERC at 61,294.
152. Florida Power & Light Co., 40 FERC 61,045 (1987) (Florida Power II).
153. 40 FERC at 61,119-21.
154. 40 FERC at 61,121
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additional interconnection between an IOU and its wholesale utility
requirements customer."'
These examples suggest that PUCs have tried to assert greater
authority over transmission rates and related "terms and conditions"
than the law appears to permit. FERC's rebuff of these requests
caused relatively little controversy, and nowhere near the rancor that
accompanied its Middle South and AEP decisions: relatively few actual
dollars were at stake in the Florida proceedings and states tradition-
ally have taken relatively little interest in transmission facility
planning. 56 Transmission facility additions typically have been viewed
by utility planners and state regulators as adjuncts to the much
larger generation investments. 57 However, the recent focus on
transmission planning, especially to meet the needs of the expanding
bulk power markets, 58 and the numerous calls to develop a cohesive
national transmission policy59 have created an environment in which
the respective roles of state and federal jurisdiction over transmission
are likely to be reevaluated."w
The first major legal test of the efficacy and certainty of current
jurisdictional boundaries may result from a recent order by the
Wisconsin Public Service Commission (WPSC). The WPSC is
requiring all Wisconsin utilities to enter into joint use agreements
and to provide transmission service on their pooled transmission
facilities to all Wisconsin utilities with a retail service obligation. 6'
The order also establishes a series of principles to be followed in the
development of joint-use agreements. 62 Wisconsin utilities have
asserted that some of these principles relate to rates and terms and
conditions of transmission service66 and have petitioned FERC for
a declaratory order preempting them.' The order has also been
155. City of Piqua v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 46 FERC 61,143 (1989).
156. NGA TRANSMISSION REPORT, supra note 136, at 15-17.
157. In 1987, on national average, transmission accounted for only about 12% of total
utility investments, in contrast to 60% for generation. FERC TTF REPORT, supra note 22,
at 59-60.
158. See NGA TRANSMISSION REPORT, supra note 136.
159. FERC TTF REPORT, supra note 22, at 1-4.
160. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 135, at 34-39.
161. Advance Plans for Construction of Facilities as filed with the Commission for
Review and Approval Pursuant to Section 196.491, Wisconsin Statutes (Apr. 6, 1989). This
order was issued pursuant to an explicit statewide power supply planning authority granted
by state statute. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 196.491 (West 1989).
162. Id.
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challenged in state court.' + Unlike the Florida cases discussed above,
however, the WPSC order is based on a specific state statute
granting the WPSC authority in a general area, supply planning,
that is at the core of traditional state authority. If FERC preempts
the WPSC order, the resulting dispute would represent a major
conflict between two basic sets of regulatory objectives, each firmly
grounded in tradition and statute.
E. Alternative Models for Dual Economic Regulation
The preceding discussion reveals that state and federal regulators
increasingly have pursued different objectives and protected different
interests. Moreover, they are increasingly employing different
approaches as wholesale bulk power markets become more competi-
tive. The single-state utility rate base model, with the state granting
the utility a monopoly franchise in return for an obligation to serve,
imposes an inevitable parochialism or insularity on state regulation.tM
As a result, the single state approach encourages planning decisions
that are increasingly at odds with federal regulation, 7 which
attempts to increase the overall efficiency of wholesale bulk power
markets. Finally, FERC is limiting its use of the rate base model in
regulating bulk power trades while this method is still pervasive at
the state level.
The strong monopoly powers of vertically integrated utilities also
have enabled states to pursue social objectives other than economic
efficiency. For example, rate stability generally has been an over-
riding goal of state regulators. Moreover, some states have used
utility rates to levy taxes, subsidize technologies supported by strong
interest groups, and encourage conservation and environmental
measures." A few states have explicitly sought to redistribute income
165. Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, No. 89CV-716, consolid.
with Northern States Power Co. v. Charles H. Thompson, No. 89CV309, (Wis. Cir. Ct. of
Brown County 1989).
166. See Brown, supra note 135. While FERC has also traditionally used that model
for wholesale requirements service, it represents a small and declining percentage of gross
electricity revenues.
167. It must be noted, however, that contrary trends, i.e., market-oriented trends, are
developing within state PUC regulation. See infra setion F. See generally FERC TrF REPORT,
supra note 22, at chs. 3 & 6 and cases cited supra note 19.
168. The literature on these subjects is massive. See Samuels, Public Utilities and the
Theory of Power (especially Pt. 3.D) and Regulation Used by Those Who Control It, in PERSPEC-
TIVES IN PUBLIC REGUlATION: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 13-23 (Milton Russell ed.
1973); see also Phillips, Public Utilities as Tax Collectors, in THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC
UTIunES: THEORY AND PRACICE 264-65. For a survey, see Thompson & Jones, The
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through "lifeline" rates and payment limits.169 All of these objectives
often are subsumed under the rubric of equity as a goal of public
utility regulation. 70 However, as economic conditions change, state
equity concerns are increasingly conflicting with FERG's efforts to
promote economic efficiency in bulk power markets .'7  These
differences in regulatory objectives and methods will put additional
pressure on any mechanism for sharing jurisdiction between federal
and state agencies. Nevertheless, other statutory models, such as the
federally imposed "regulatory partnership" contained in Section 210
of PURPA, 72 may be better suited to reconcile some federal/state
tensions than the bright line approach of the FPA.
1. Evaluation of the Bright Line Model
The bright line model of the FPA has encouraged two types of
responses to the intensifying state/federal conflicts manifest in
situations such as Middle South.7's First, FERC and the courts have
drawn increasingly fine distinctions in defense of the bright line.
Second, the desire to preserve the bright line approach has tended
to encourage the resolution of state/federal conflicts in highly
contested judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. While these proceed-
ings have produced a series of all-or-nothing jurisdictional decisions,
such as the Middle South cases, they have not reconciled the differ-
ences in regulatory approaches between the states and FERC.
7 4
Moreover, these cases have placed far too much emphasis on who
is to regulate a particular transaction, and far too little on defining
regulatory objectives.'75 Differences in regulatory objectives and
methodologies create incentives for regulated firms to manipulate
Polities and Prospects for Regulatory Reform, in REGULA'InRy POuCY AND PRAcnCE:
REGULATING BE] rR AND REGUKIXING Lrss 93-119. Thompson and Jones cite many of
the foundation papers on this topic.
169. "Lifeline" rates generally assure certain minimum amounts of service to
customers, usually at discount rates.
170. For an excellent introduction to the pressures on PUCs to recognize equity
issues in utility pricing, see E. ZAJAC, FAIRNESS OR EFFICIENCY: AN INTRODUGTION TO
PUBLIC UTILnlY PRICING (1978).
171. A poignant example is the furor over FERC's decision not to permit states to
subsidize QF power in their implementation of Section 210 of PURPA. See text accompany-
ing infra note 210.
172. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1988).
173. Some state officials went as far as asserting that the FERC's decisions over the
Grand Gulf unit would seriously damage the economies of some of the poorest states in the
nation. See Vince & Moot, supra note 1, at 8-9, 31.
174. See supra notes 105, 113, 117.
175. Id.
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corporate structure so as to select the desired forum. 76 The fear of
this phenomenon may encourage state regulators to protect their
jurisdictional turf, rather than evaluate restructuring proposals on
economic efficiency grounds.'
A broader concern with the bright line model is that it has not
produced a climate in which regulation is capable of adapting to
fundamental changes in the industry. This concern may be symp-
tomatic of a problem inherent in any effort to statutorily divide
jurisdiction with a bright line. As conditions change, the bright line
needs to be drawn in different places. Vested economic and political
interests, however, consolidate around an existing bright line.
2. The PURPA Model
Congress enacted Section 210 of PURPA as part of the broad
panoply of legislation comprising the National Energy Act of 1978.
Section 210 encouraged qualifying cogeneration and small power
production facilities (QFs). 78 These facilities were perceived to have
been neglected under the traditional regulatory system, largely
because independent producers could not overcome the entry
barriers maintained by utilities with strong monopoly and monop-
sony powers.""9 Congress resolved this problem by requiring utilities
to purchase QF power, and to provide supplementary and backup
power to QFs when necessary.8 ' Furthermore, Congress gave FERC
wide discretion to exempt QFs from most aspects of public utility
regulation, 8' a discretion FERC used liberally to deregulate QFs in
most respects. Nevertheless, most commentators at the time of
enactment expected QFs to provide a relatively small adjunct to the
traditional utility supply.
However, once the Section 210 scheme as implemented by FERC
survived major challenges to its legality,82 QF capacity grew rapidly,
far exceeding initial expectations. Coinciding with reductions in
utilities' demand projections and the general aversion of utilities to
176. See supra note 74. See aoo NGA Electric Reform Report, supra note 15, at 14-
15, 24.
177. A powerful illustration of this fear was the rejection of a restructuring proposal
by Public Service Company of New Mexico.
178. See supra note 98.
179. See supra note 99.
180. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a)-(c) (1988).
181. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (1988).
182. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); American Paper Inst. v. American
Elec. Power, 461 U.S. 402 (1983).
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building capital intensive plants, QF power became a major con-
tributor to new power supply in some regions.
The essence of this success lies in the fact that the PURPA model
permitted a new contracting regime for power supply. In this
regime, the risks and rewards of power production could be
allocated more efficiently between QFs and purchasing utilities in
the light of changing economic conditions. Although some of the
early risk allocations under PURPA had problems (they passed too
much fuel risk downstream to consumers, or they permitted over-
leveraged QF capital structures), this approach generally has allowed
utilities to compensate QFs for bearing supply risks traditionally
passed to consumers under the rate base model.-' Because of its
superior ability to allocate risk, the PURPA model has provided a
useful framework for developing an unregulated generating sector
in an industry dominated by regulated entities. The PURPA model
thus offers a template for efforts to restructure both the electric
industry and the division of labor among regulators.' This model
establishes a fundamentally different relationship between state and
federal regulation in monitoring new power supply additions.
Without Section 210, QF sales to utilities would be wholesale
transactions subject to exclusive FERC jurisdiction, while most utility
sales of supplementary and backup power8 5 to QFs would be a retail
transaction subject to state PUG regulation. Instead of reinforcing
the FPA regulatory dichotomy, Congress attempted to create a
partnership between FERC and PUCs for implementing Section 210.
The statute requires FERC to define QF status8 6 and to establish the
standards under which QFs may buy from and sell to utilities.8 7 It
also requires state PUCs to implement FERC rules.' Section 210
thus gives PUCs the frontline, day-to-day function of regulating both
QF sales to and purchases from utilities, and a variety of related
issues, such as interconnection requirements and compensation.
Hence, the partnership grants FERC authority over a discrete part
183. Indeed, the two biggest problems with this approach have occurred when
regulation has supplanted negotiation: 1) when states set administratively determined
"avoided cost" rates for purchase of QF power, and 2) when FERC has certified QFs. The
emergence of state bidding schemes and all source bidding are direct responses to these two
problems.
184. The PURPA model has been considered or adopted by other countries, such as
the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Thailand, contemplating a greater role
for independent power producers.
185. Supra note 145.
186. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a), (e) (1988).
187. Id.
188. 16 U.S.C § 824a-3() (1988).
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of retail ratemaking and delegates a significant portion of federal
wholesale authority to state PUCs. 89
The PURPA model is also a departure from traditional utility
regulation in that it focuses rate regulation on the purchasing utility
rather than the selling utility. Since state prudence review typically
focuses on the purchasing utility, giving states a large role in setting
the purchaser's procurement policies appears intuitively rational.
Subsequent developments, such as the evolution of competitive
procurement schemes under state regulation, support this intuition.
The PURPA model, implemented at the state level through
generic rulemaking and case-specific decisions, has provided a
detailed system of regulation. State PUCs have proven capable of
responding to major regulatory mistakes and changing economic
conditions, especially in setting prices for utility purchases of QF
power.' In its implementing rules, 9 ' FERC had determined that
these prices should be based on the purchasing utility's full avoided
costs, i.e., the marginal cost the utility would incur in meeting the
increment of supply provided by the QF if the QF purchase were
not available. Many PUCs have already updated their avoided cost
calculations to account for utility long-term capacity purchases which
displace plans to build locally. Moreover, where incorrect forecasts
led to higher than efficient prices, as in California, PUCs moved
quickly to correct such errors. Some states have learned from the
mistakes of others, giving credence to the notion of a fifty-state
regulatory laboratory, a notion used to justify the substantial initial
discretion given by FERC to states.
92
Perhaps the most important adjustment to the PURPA scheme
was the relatively quick recognition, by both FERC and the PUCs,
that Congress' original assumption, that PURPA would be only a
189. More dramatically, however, Section 210 effectively conscripted PUCs to
implement federal policy under Section 210. This aspect of the statutory scheme was
challenged by the State of Mississippi, which argued that Section 210 (as well as Title I) of
PURPA violated the Tenth Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected this assertion. FERC
v. Mississippi 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
190. FERC has been less successful in adapting its definition of QFs to changing
conditions. In certifying QFs, FERC has had to draw increasingly fine and artificial
distinctions, seldom conforming with economic or engineering efficiency, to separate those
facilities that "qualify" from those that do not. Most of this response has been dictated by
the statutory definitions.
191. FERC Regulations With Regard to Small Production and Cogeneration, 18
C.F.R. § 292.101 (1988).
192. In its 1980 implementing rules, FERC afforded PUCs "great latitude in
determining the manner of implementation of [its] rules." Section-by-Section Analysis,
Implementation by State Regulatory Authorities and Non-Regulated Electric Utilities, FERC
Implementation, 18 C.F.R. § 292.401 (1989).
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small adjunct to traditional utility supply, had not proven accurate.
By 1986, it was apparent in some states that QFs were offering more
capacity than utility systems needed.' Indeed, a major complaint of
utilities was that they were being required by PURPA, or by state
implementation of PURPA, to pay capacity credits to QFs when they
did not need capacity.'9 In response to this and other complaints
about PUC implementation, 95 voiced in Congressional hearings on
PURPA in 1986, FERC undertook in early 1987 a review of its
PURPA rules. This FERC review culminated in four Notices of
Proposed Rulemaking (NOPRs) in 1988 on administered avoided
costs ("AdFAC"),'9 "Bidding,"'" independent power producers
("IPPs'),'" and QF certification."9
The most profound adjustment to PURPA appeared in the
"bidding" NOPR, which contemplated permitting a competitive
procurement mechanism to determine which QFs should receive
capacity credits in cases where more QF capacity was offered than
a utility needed.200 Advocates of this approach argued that it would
not only produce a more accurate assessment of the utility's true
avoided costs than would a regulator's estimate, but also would
ensure that the more efficient QFs came into production first.2 1 In
order to avoid concerns about a "QF ghetto," and to escape the
technological constraints of QF certification, FERC advanced the
notion that all of a utility's supply needs should be subject to some
form of competitive procurement and not be reserved for certain
193. California, Texas, and some major mid-Atlantic states, such as New York, New
Jersey, and Virginia, showed this phenomenon early in the scheme's implementation history.
See BIDDING FOR POwER, supra note 30.
194. This assertion, however, does not find support in FERC's implementing rules.
See FERC Regulations, supra note 191.
195. Many utilities also asserted that state PUCs were setting rates above their true
"avoided costs." QFs raised a variety of concerns, such as rates below avoided costs,
excessive interconnection charges, denial of transmission service, and utilities unduly
protracting negotiations.
196. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Administrative Determination of Full Avoided
Costs, Sales of Power to Qualifying Facilities, and Interconnection Facilities. FERC Stats. &
Regs. 1 32,457, 53 Fed. Reg. 9331 (1988).
197. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulations Governing Bidding Programs,
FERC Stats. & Regs. 9 32,455, 53 Fed. Reg. 9324 (1988).
198. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulations Governing Independent Power
Producers, FERC Stats. & Regs. 1 32,456,53 Fed. Reg. 9377 (1988).
199. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulations Governing the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, FERC Stats. & Regs. 1 32,465, 53 Fed. Reg. 31021 (1988).
200. Bidding NOPR, supra note 197.
201. Id.
466
Vol. 7: 427, 1990
Tensions in Energy Regulation
groups of producers."2 FERC also proposed that states should have
the option of all source bidding in their implementation of Section
210 of PURPA.2"
While the "Bidding" NOPR itself was not promulgated as a final
rule, the concept of competitive procurement was quickly adopted
by state PUCs in their implementation of PURPA. The PUCs built
upon the experience of a few states that had experimented with the
concept prior to the issuance of the NOPR, and upon the ideas in
the NOPR itself.2 The concept of competitive procurement ap-
parently meshes well with a growing state trend towards "least cost"
planning.0" While these mandates vary widely in approach, this
development is part of a more general trend towards states assuming
a more active role in monitoring utility power supply planning
rather than relying on ex-post-facto prudence review to discipline
utility supply planning.2"
The experience of state PUG efforts to implement FERC's PURPA
rules demonstrates the adaptability of both the PUCs and the Section
210 scheme itself to changing industry conditions. The metamor-
phosis of the avoided cost concept is also remarkable. It is quickly
evolving from one that relies on traditional utility and regulatory
forecasting of costs, to one that relies on a market-determined price.
This evolution supports the optimistic view that bidding can lead to
more efficient supplier choice decisions than any regulatory allocation
or first-come, first-served scheme.
Many of the daily state/federal tensions in implementing the
PURPA model were resolved in the dialogue engendered by FERC's
various PURPA review hearings and other informal exchanges. This
is especially notable in an era of great uncertainty over the future
of the industry in which regulators are confronted with difficult
issues in reconciling emerging competition with traditional economic
regulation. Indeed, PURPA has apparently contributed greatly to
creative PUG thinking in resolving that tension as well as related
state/federal tensions. This intellectual climate also may have helped
202. Id. A "QF ghetto" might occur if all QFs were required to bid for only a part
of a utility's power needs, thus driving down the price of QF power, but not subjecting the
utility's other supply options to the same competitive discipline.
203. Id.
204. At the time of writing, at least 36 utilities in at least 17 states are known to be
implementing or considering bidding mechanisms. FERC TTF REPORT, supra note 22, at
29-30.
205. See Sant, supra note 103. At least 40 states have adopted this approach.
206. See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 149.
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avoid some potential jurisdictional conflicts within the PURPA
scheme. However, this approach could not resolve two disputes.
The first dispute occurred in 1988. In an early draft of the
AdFAC NOPR, the FERC staff proposed that rates for purchases of
QF power by multistate utilities should be the same in each state
because the utility has a single avoided cost. Although the provision
did not appear in the NOPR itself, it caused a furor among PUCs,
who asserted that it would unduly interfere with their ability to
tailor PURPA implementation to conform to distinctive state
conditions and policies." 7 This concern quickly led to broader
charges that the three-part NOPR package issued by FERC in March
198808 was unduly preemptive of state authority.' 9 The real issue
was one of balancing the degree of latitude FERC should leave to
state PUCs in implementing Section 210 against a national need to
prescribe standards to ensure overall efficiency. In the end, the
PUCs prevailed in their quest for continued broad discretion to
implement PURPA.
Another furor emerged from a 1988 FERC decision limiting the
ability of state PUCs to require utilities to pay rates to QFs in excess
of the full avoided costs level under PURPA..2 " The New York State
legislature had imposed a minimum six-cent-per-kilowatt-hour rate
for purchases from QFs even when this rate was higher than actual
avoided costs.2 ' The State PUCs objected vigorously to the FERC
decision to overturn the New York law, arguing that FERC had
intruded upon state authority without furthering overall efficiency.
While FERC did not reverse the decision, it did stay the decision
207. See Bidding NOPR, supra note 197, Opinion of Commissioner Trabandt,
Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part [hereinafter Trabandt NOPR dissent], FERC Stats.
& Regs. 32,455, at 32,080-81 (1988).
208. This package consisted of the AdFAC, Bidding, and IPPs NOPRs, supra notes
196, 197, and 198.
209. See generally Trabandt NOPR dissent, supra note 207, at 32,061. In fact, the use
of the term preemptive in this context is legally inaccurate. FERC was exercising its
statutory authority under Section 210(a) of PURPA to prescribe, and revise when needed,
the standards by which state implementation of the federal scheme under Section 210(0 was
to occur. No independent state authority was being preempted by FERC's exercise of that
authority, even if it were exercised in the overly prescriptive manner asserted by FERC's
critics. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Concurring Statement of Commissioner
Stalon in Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 43 FERC 61,067 (1988). In fact, most of the
assertedly over-prescriptive provisions appeared in the "guidance" rather than the
mandatory parts of the AdFAC and Bidding NOPRs.
210. See, e.g., Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 43 FERC 1 61,067 (1988).
211. Id. at 61,185.
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pending resolution of the broader policy issue in the context of the
AdFAC NOPR.'2 That resolution has not yet occurred.
The rancor produced by these two FERC actions was
disproportionate to their importance. However, they illustrate two
conclusions from the experience of implementing Section 210 of
PURPA to date. First, PUCs quickly and aggressively asserted an
entitlement to broad latitude in implementing the Section 210
scheme. Efforts by FERC to prescribe new standards created con-
troversy. Second, the fundamental policy conflict in these two
situations was created by FERC's desire to shape state regulation so
as to promote efficiency in wholesale bulk power markets, while at
the same time leaving state PUCs the flexibility to pursue broader
regulatory objectives. While there has been a clear intellectual shift
in many state PUCs towards encouraging more efficient and
competitive wholesale power procurement, state PUCs predictably are
reluctant to forego traditional regulatory prerogatives.
The latter tension is inherent in any shared jurisdictional system.
Moreover, it is a tension that may become more acute as the need
for greater efficiency in bulk power markets increases. However,
although FERC cannot push the logic of efficiency in this regula-
tory partnership too far without incurring a serious political
backlash, the PURPA Section 210 scheme has forced FERC and the
PUCs into a closer day-to-day relationship, characterized by a
dialogue that takes place outside of a quasi-judicial context. That
dialogue has tended to ease tensions and to permit the continued
viability of the PURPA scheme. It has also heightened state
sensitivity to the need for greater efficiency in the bulk power
markets, a concern central to many of FERC's initiatives.
3. The "Concurrent Jurisdiction" Model
A third model for sharing state and federal regulatory authority
exists in an area closely related to economic regulation, the regula-
tion of utility corporate structure and finance. Section 203 of the
FPA requires utilities to obtain FERC authorization prior to making
major acquisitions or mergers."' Many states have similar require-
ments."4 The FPA, however, does not provide a mechanism for
212. Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 43 FERC 1 61,547 (1988).
213. 16 U.S.C. § 824b (1988).
214. For instance, all but two states require prior PUG approval of mergers or
consolidations, and all but three require prior PUC approval for sales of generating units.
NARUC, ANNUAL REPORT ON UTILITY AND CARRIER RFGULATION 529 (1988).
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allocating state/federal jurisdictional authority or resolving disputes.215
Hence, each affected jurisdiction has an effective veto power over a
proposed merger or acquisition. Nor does the FPA prescribe any
procedural mechanism for reconciling inconsistent orders. A merger
could be approved at the state level, approved subject to certain
changes at the federal or another state level, and then returned to
the original state for reapproval and further modification.
Recently, federal/state tensions arose over a proposal to merge
two large Pacific northwest utilities, Pacificorp and Utah Power &
Light Company. The seven state commissions involved with the
merger had granted initial approval before FERC acted on the
proposal. After a detailed administrative proceeding, a FERC
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the proposed merger
posed too great a threat to competition to receive federal approval."6
The Commission, though accepting the factual findings of the ALJ,
nevertheless approved the merger subject to the stringent condition
that the merged company would permit access to its transmission
grid at cost-based prices, conditions which both companies subse-
quently accepted."t 7 Despite major concerns by the Utah PUC that
the FERC-imposed conditions would damage the interests of Utah's
ratepayers, the company was able to persuade all the PUCs that the
benefits of the merger would outweigh any detriments caused by
FERC's conditions.1
This case vividly illustrates the potential for conflict between
FERC's regulatory objective of enhancing the efficiency of the
wholesale bulk power markets and the more parochial objectives of
state PUCs in protecting the interests of retail ratepayers. In the
Utah case, FERC's interest arose from the possibility of one of the
merging companies using its monopoly power over bottleneck
transmission paths to gain for itself and its ratepayers a portion of
the rents associated with interstate power transactions. 2 9 The PUCs
concerned, however, recognized these differences in regulatory
objectives as well as the legitimacy of FERC's role in protecting the
efficiency of interstate markets. In future transactions, other states
215. In contrast, FERC's authority to review security issuances and assumptions of
liability is only applicable where the utility's "security issues are [not] regulated by a State
Commission." 16 U.S.C. § 824c(f) (1988).
216. Utah Power & Light Co., 43 FERC 1 63,030 (1988).
217. Utah Power & Light Co., 45 FERC 61,095 (1988).
218. The PUC most concerned, the Utah Public Service Commission, agreed that
the benefits were likely to outweigh the costs, but nevertheless placed the risk on the
utility.
219. 45 FERC 61,095 at 61,287-89.
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also could exercise monopoly power over transmission paths which
would damage their neighboring states and reduce the overall
efficiency of the wholesale power markets that benefits all states in
the long term.
F. Conclusion: The Impact of Competition
The growth of the wholesale power markets, and the breakdown
of traditional regulatory systems, have spawned competitive forces
within the traditionally monopolistic electric power industry.
Competition, in turn, has engendered regulatory responses that are
likely to encourage its further development. As a result, regulatory
reform that encourages greater competition has been at the heart
of many recent debates over the future of electric power regulation.
Many traditionalists have expressed deep concerns about whether
competition in the electric industry will undermine the traditional
industry structure and the efficiencies that structure has provided.
However, regulators are not likely to reign in competitive forces
absent a broad political col..... .s involving the industry, regulators,
and legislators.2  Competition in wholesale power markets, at least
between franchised utilities, seems to be widely supported.2 ' In this
environment, QFs and IPPs are likely to gain increased access to
bulk power markets, thereby intensifying competition in the generat-
ing sector of the industry.
Nevertheless, regulators must guide competitive forces carefully
to assure efficient results. 22  Furthermore, clear rules-of-the-road must
exist for transmission access to assure the technical integrity of the
grid, particularly as bulk power markets become more competitive.
Such rules will be crucially important to maintaining reliability and
economic/engineering efficiency of increasingly complex intersystem
transmission grids. These rules will become more critical as the
informal agreements that currently sustain cooperation are super-
seded by open rivalry between the utilities that control transmission.
Some of the concerns over emerging competition expressed by
220. There appears to be a weak consensus that competition is not desirable in
distribution, and there are few advocates for increased competition for transmission service.
221. Most political opposition to competition emanates from a group of IOUs
concerned about independent power producers rather than greater competition in inter-
utility trading of excess capacity. See The Competitive Wholesale Electric Generation Act of 1989,
Hearings before the Sen. Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28
(1989) (testimony of the Electric Reliability Coalition) [hereinafter ERC PUHCA Testimony]
(concerning the Public Utility Holding Company Act-PUHCA).
222. See generally FERC TTF REPoRT, supra note 22.
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traditionalists have been based, in significant part, on fears that
competition at the wholesale level will inevitably lead to an undis-
ciplined common carriage regime and to bypass at the retail level."'
However, wholesale competition has the potential to enhance
significantly the overall efficiency of power production and to lower
the differentials between different utilities' average costs that tend to
encourage bypass.2 In contrast, retail bypass might initially shift cost
burdens among retail customers, threaten the financial viability of
some utilities, and impose inequitable burdens on captive customers
while perhaps not significantly enhancing efficiency 25 Regulators
might therefore be tempted to limit the enormous potential efficiency
gains from greater wholesale competition due to misplaced fears that
this will encourage bypass. Fortunately, the fear of bypass seems to
be dissipating. Utilities which were previously concerned about the
danger of competition and bypass are today making conceptual
proposals that would advance competition at the wholesale level
while resisting it at the retail level.226
A perennial concern of many PUCs is that growing competition
at the wholesale level, especially from QFs and IPPs, may result in
reduced state and increased FERC jurisdiction.227 Although their
concern is in one sense valid,228 this jurisdictional shift already had
begun under FERC's traditional coordination regulation, well before
QFs or IPPs were evident.22' Hence, FERC jurisdiction will likely
increase as a result of wholesale market growth even if QFs and
IPPs are blocked from the market.
223. See, e.g., supra note 221, ERC PUHCA Testimony at 27-28. For a statement of
concerns over the reliability and economic effect of partial bypass, see Porter & Maliszewski,
Technical and Economic Constraints on Competition in Electric Power Supply, 122 Pub. Util. Fort.,
No. 10, at 20 (1988).
224. See Stalon Testimony, supra note 85, at 25-28, 30-34.
225. Id.
226. An excellent example is the proposal on transmission pricing and access policy
of the so-called "Group of 5," consisting of five major IOUs, made to FERC in August 1989
for discussion purposes. The proposal delineates very different sets of issues related to
wholesale and retail transmission access, and views the former as a primary vehicle for
enhancing competition. See FERC TTF REPoWr, supra note 22, at 307.
227. See, e.g., NGA ELECTRIC REFORM RKPORT, supra note 15.
228. As utilities meet more of their future supply needs through wholesale purchases
of power rather than building plants themselves, direct state control over the rates for new
plant additions will be replaced by FERC regulation of wholesale sales. However, the critical
authority of states to review the prudence of wholesale purchases will (outside the multistate
holding company context) remain.
229. These coordination markets became inevitably more competitive themselves as
utility capacity surpluses grew and demand growth dropped, the result of the recession of
the early 1980s and of planning or forecasting errors under the traditional system.
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This growth in federal jurisdiction does not necessarily weaken
effective state control. Just as state PUCs have typically reviewed ex-
post-facto the prudence of generation expansions, they can now
review the prudence of utility purchases. The more competitive the
markets in which those purchases are made, the more effective state
review will be, since PUCs will be able to review purchases in the
context of a series of openly-priced competitive options. This will
almost certainly be an easier task and produce more efficient results
than attempting to review the long and complex construction history
of a large nuclear or coal plant, which was typical of many of the
construction prudence reviews in the 1980s. Similarly, more efficient
wholesale markets should facilitate ex-ante prudence reviews, or
monitoring of utility purchase-the review of currently available
market alternatives should be more effective and less speculative
than an effort to project the costs of a long-gestation generating
plant23
0
Moreover, a shift in the focus of state regulation from power
generation to distribution and procurement would not undermine
the franchise utility structure and the accompanying obligation to
serve-both are closely associated with the distribution function. The
nature of traditional regulation supports this view: state regulators
typically reviewed capacity expansions when utilities attempted to
include the costs in retail rates, not when utilities planned or
commenced construction of these plants."' Indeed, FERC has
designed many of its proposed reforms, such as the Bidding and
IPPs NOPRs, to give states the ability to expand utility procurement
options to more effectively fulfill their prudence review function. In
addition to exposing utilities to more competitive discipline at the
generation level,112 these changes might also expand the range of
generation technology options at a time when environmental and
financial constraints may be limiting the utilities' own abilities to
build traditional coal and nuclear plants. The speed with which
PUCs are adopting competitive procurement underscores the
importance of these expanded options.
With the expanded importance of state PUC control of utility
procurement options, the Pike County doctrine becomes crucial in
230. As noted previously, errors in forecasting construction costs, especially of nuclear
units, led to serious economic problems for utilities in the 1980s. See supra note 102 and
accompanying text.
231. See text following supra note 41.
232. Most of the major rate increases in the 1980s, which led to rate shock, were
caused by new generation plants built by utilities.
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ensuring that state PUCs can review the prudence of utility
purchases. The development of efficient bulk power markets will
require the PUCs to have a strong prudence review ability at the
distribution level. To date, no one has suggested that the distribu-
tion function will be deregulated or exposed to significant
competition. Distribution is still a natural monopoly function in
which competition is likely to be destructive. Hence, it is likely to
be subject to traditional regulation for the foreseeable future. As
long as retail competition is not used as a means of ensuring
efficient procurement of supply by distribution utilities, it is
important that PUCs should have the ability, through prudence
reviews, to prevent utilities from passing the costs of inefficient
procurement decisions through to ratepayers. Since efficient
procurement is a critical ingredient of efficient wholesale markets,
FERC as well as state PUCs should have a strong interest in
preserving the Pike County doctrine."'3 Furthermore, VERC has
recognized the importance of Pike County since its decisions that
originated the doctrine.3 4 The multistate holding company cases
should be seen as an exception to this rule, driven by other FERC
regulatory concerns that loomed large in that particular context.
Changes in emphasis in FERC's fulfilling its FPA coordination
mandates are likely to influence the development of the Pike County
doctrine. Previously, FERC emphasized nonmarket integration
devices such as power pools; now FERC tends to focus on market
devices such as transmission access and liberalized pricing. The
process of change is unsteady as FERC struggles with adapting new
concepts, such as "market power" and "workably competitive
markets," to an evolving regulatory context and rapidly changing
industry. This process is one that involves tension between coopera-
tion-inducing nonmarket mechanisms, and competition-inducing
market mechanisms.235 Although this tension at times makes FERC
regulation seem somewhat schizophrenic, it should be viewed as part
of a necessary evolution.3 6
233. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
234. An important recent confirmation of this principle was made in Southern
Company Services, Inc., 26 FERC 61,360 (1984). Recognition of FERC's interest in
preserving a strong Pike County doctrine is also clear in the natural gas area.
235. That tension had become evident in certain power pools, such as NEPOOL,
where utility members were finding it more profitable to trade around rather than through
the pool mechanisms.
236. Our analysis above and below reveals a notable difference between the history
of the "bright line" under the FPA and the NGA. Under the FPA, the "bright line" has
largely been viewed as a constraint on regulatory jurisdiction on both sides, subject to
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State PUCs are more likely to lose effective control over gener-
ation prices to competitive markets than to traditional FERC
economic regulation.23 For those who believe further pervasive
economic regulation is necessary for the continued efficiency of the
industry, this may be a disturbing result; for those who see competi-
tive supply markets as efficiency enhancing, it may be welcome.
II. The Evolving Boundary Between Federal and State Regulation
of the Natural Gas Industry
A. Introduction
Four major legal changes have influenced the jurisdictional
boundaries between federal and state regulatory authority over
natural gas utilities. This introduction briefly describes each of these
changes.
The first major legal change, The Natural Gas Act of 1938
(NGA),238 symbolized the transformation of the gas industry from a
local industry relying primarily on coal gas to an interstate indus-
try based largely on natural gas. The development of high-tensile
steel pipe had made possible efficient, long-distance carriage thereby
increasing the importance of natural gas in the nation's economy.
Recognizing this transformation in the nature of the gas industry,
the NGA transferred significant regulatory authority from the states
to the federal government. Nevertheless, the Act attempted to
preserve a major role for states by imposing federal jurisdiction only
on the interstate activities of natural gas companies." 9 Although
many pipelines were integrated upstream with producers and
downstream with local distribution companies (LDCs) and sold gas
both for resale and directly to end-users, the NGA limited FPC
jurisdiction over pipeline gas services to sales for resale in interstate
occasional judicial or quasi-judicial efforts to redraw it to conform to pressing current
realities. In contrast, under the NGA, we have seen a greater ability, largely conscious, of
FERC to move the effective parameters of the "bright line" through a series of administra-
tive reforms that greatly alter the state/federal relationship. There may be some lessons in
this NGA experience for electric power regulation-doubtless a factor that heightens
industry concerns over FERC administrative reform initiatives in the electric power area.
237. Insofar as state regulators are sta-ting to rely on competitive mechanisms, such
as bidding schemes, to discipline utility procurement practices, they are apparently willing
to rely on market forces where these offer clear efficiency gains over the traditional system
of supply planning and procurement review.
238. Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1988)).
239. Id.
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commerce. Pipeline company direct sales to end-use customers,
primarily large industrial customers, were not subject to FPC price
regulation.2' The transportation of such gas, however, was subject
to FPC jurisdiction. This sale-for-resale definition of federal jurisdic-
tion preserved PUC jurisdiction over LDCs.241 The Hinshaw amend-
ment to the NGA, 24' enacted in 1954, affirmed the intent of
Congress to preserve an important role for state regulation.24 This
amendment permitted pipelines taking gas from an interstate
pipeline at a state border to sell for resale within the state, unam-
biguously an interstate activity, and not be subject to FPC/FERC
jurisdiction if the state regulated the activity.2" This amendment
provides legal support for the current structure of the California gas
industry, which has no interstate pipelines except those affiliated
with California LDCs.
The NGA differs from the FPA in one important respect. The
FPA preserved almost completely the plenary authority qf states to
determine generation, transmission, and distribution needs and to
control plant siting in the electric industry. In contrast, Section 7
of the NGA requires natural gas companies to obtain a certificate
of public convenience and necessity (PC&N) from FERC before
initiating new, or abandoning old, services and facilities. Two
exceptions were made: (1) The NGA explicitly denies FERC jurisdic-
tion over natural gas distribution facilities and production or
240. Some states created a regulatory fiction that such direct sales customers were
actually customers of a nearby LDC; the pipeline billed the LDC for gas delivered to the
direct-sale customer, and the LDC billed the customer at rates determined by the state
PUC. This fiction also was used by farmers who received gas directly from the pipeline.
241. One troublesome ambiguity in the allocation of jurisdictional responsibility arose
in those LDCs that serve two or more states, e.g., Washington Gas & Light which serves
a part of Virginia, a part of Maryland and the District of Columbia. This ambiguity became
especially troublesome when LDCs unbundled their services and provided transportation
services across state borders. In 1988, Congress amended the NGA to reverse certain FERC
decisions and to clarify the division of responsibilities between local and federal regulators.
See Uniform Regulatory Jurisdiction Act, Pub. L. No. 100-474, 102 Stat. 2302 (1988).
242. Pub. L. No. 83-323, 68 Stat. 36 (1954).
243. 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (1988). "The provisions of this act shall not apply to any
person engaged in or legally authorized to engage in the transportation in interstate
commerce or the sale in interstate commerce for resale, of natural gas received by such
person from another person within or at the boundary of a state if all the natural gas so
received is ultimately consumed within such state, or to any facilities used by such person
for such transportation or sale, provided that the rates and service of such person and
facilities be subject to regulation by a State Commission."
244. Hinshaw pipelines, thus, are interstate pipelines regulated by states. In the
terminology of this Article, they are not included as "interstate pipelines." FERC has ruled
that Hinshaw pipelines are LDCs in the context of NGPA Section 311. Order No. 63,
FERC Stats. and Regs. 30,118 (1980).
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gathering facilities,'* and (2) limits its authority to order a pipeline
company to initiate new construction or services." On the other
hand, the Commission has broad authority to establish conditions
before approving a certificate of PC&N.
2 47
The second milestone in the evolution of gas industry regulation
was the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Wisconsin.' " Phillips held that producers who sold natural gas in
interstate markets were natural gas companies under the NGA and,
therefore, were subject to price regulation by the FPC. Later
decisions expanded on Phillips, holding that all gas from the outer
continental shelf (OCS) and all pipelines connecting the OCS to the
mainland were subject to FPC/FERC jurisdiction. Producers who
dedicated non-OCS gas to an intrastate market, however, were not
regulated by the FPC. They were free to sell at regulated or
unregulated prices as determined by the state in which the gas was
located. Dedication might be by well, share of a well, or by field, as
determined by the contract between the producer and the purchaser.
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA)'4 9 constitutes the
third milestone in the evolution of the gas industry. This Act, one
of five parts of the National Energy Act of 1978, changed the border
between state and federal regulation in two important ways. First,
Congress set in law, by formula, a ceiling price for almost all gas at
wellheads, including intrastate gas formerly unregulated or regulated
by states."' This Act thus relieved FERC of most of its respon-
sibilities for pricing gas and put in place a schedule for deregulating
all wellhead prices, thereby initiating a phased reversal of the Phillips
decision.' Second, the Act granted intrastate pipelines certain rights
to engage in interstate transactions while escaping most of the
regulatory burdens associated with interstate status.25 2 However, some
245. See NGA § l(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1988).
246. See NGA § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 717fta) (1988).
247. See NGA § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1988).
248. 347 U.S. 682 (1954).
249. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (1988)).
250. NGPA, Tit. I, 15 U.S.C. § 3311 (1988). Two exceptions to this generalization
are Sections 104(b)(2) and 107(b). Both Sections granted the Commission power to raise
prices for the described categories of gas.
251. NGPA Title I, 15 U.S.C. § 3311. In 1989, the Congress enacted the Natural
Gas Decontrol Act of 1989 (Section 2 of P.L. No. 101-60, July 26, 1989) which repealed
Title I effective January 1, 1993, thereby accelerating the schedule for removing wellhead
ceiling prices.
252. NGPA § 311, 15 U.S.C. § 3371 (1988).
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federal regulation of intrastate pipeline transportation rates was
imposed. 53
The fourth milestone, FERC Order No. 436, promulgated in
October 1985,254 initiated a major shift in regulatory boundaries.
With Order No. 436, FERC attempted to build the post-NGPA
natural gas industry around market-disciplined producers by
changing the role of interstate regulated pipelines and LDCs. After
the Order, pipeline company gas merchants would be required to
compete with non-jurisdictional merchants and LDCs would be
required to accept responsibility for selecting the gas merchants from
which they would buy. In reviewing Order No. 436, the D.C. Circuit
noted that
The Order envisages a complete restructuring of the natural
gas industry. It may well come to rank with the three great
regulatory milestones of the industry: The passageof the
Natural Gas Act in 1938, the imposition of price controls on
independent producers' wellhead sales under Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Wisconsin, and adoption of the Natural Gas Policy Act in
1978.25
This Order reversed many of the key principles upon which the
FPC had regulated interstate pipelines during the previous 40 years.
It encouraged pipeline companies to unbundle their transportation
services and to ship gas on a nondiscriminatory basis.25 It also
attempted to reduce greatly the barriers to constructing new pipe-
line facilities,257 and to change the guiding principle for rate design
from a primary emphasis on equity to economic efficiency. 5 In
addition, Order No. 436 provided a signal that FERC intended to
shift crucially important decisionmaking powers to state PUCs and
to markets. (At the same time Order 436 redrew the boundaries
between markets and regulation in a dual regulated industry it also
redrew boundaries between state and federal regulatory jurisdic-
tions.) Finally, since monopoly power in regulated firms is often
mutually reinforcing, by weakening monopoly power in one segment
253. Id.
254. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, FERC
Stats. & Regs. 30,665 (1985) [hereinafter Order No. 436].
255. Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 1468 (1988) (citations omitted).
256. Order No. 436, supra note 254, at Preface Part IV(A)(1-9).
257. Id., Part IV (C).
258. Id., Part IV (A)(1)(C), (A)(10).
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of the industry, Order No. 436 has tended to reduce monopoly
power throughout the industry.
The evolving boundary between federal and state regulatory
jurisdictions currently consists of dissolving segments of the industry
created by pre-NGPA regulatory and court decisions and crystal-
lizing those segments created by the NGPA and by post-NGPA
regulatory and court decisions. That evolving boundary can best be
described by tracing its origins and shifts.
B. The Natural Gas System Before Phillips
Before the Supreme Court's Phillips decision, and for some time
afterwards, the FPC defined its task as essentially promotional. This
role developed naturally out of the economic circumstances of the
early industry: natural gas was found largely as a by-product of the
search for oil. Consequently, optimal pricing of gas was not seen as
a serious regulatory objective. The potential gains from using this
by-product gas in remote locations were large, but so were the risks.
One of the FPC's primary responsibilities was to allocate these risks
among industry participants.
Building long-distance, long-lasting pipelines raised two risks:
(1) the risk that gas supplies would not be sufficient to fill pipelines
for a period long enough to recover their construction costs, and (2)
the risk for individual pipelines that end-use markets would be lost
before construction costs were recovered. In order to allocate these
risks among the risk-averse LDCs, pipelines, and financial markets,
the FPC adopted a three-part strategy.
1. The FPC's Strategy
First, the FPC permitted interstate pipelines to offer a bundled
service. They were not required to offer transportation services to
downstream LDCs or end-users who might want to buy gas directly
from producers. Since most pipelines offered only a bundled service,
they used the monopoly power inherent in transportation to create
a monopoly over the sale of gas in many downstream markets.
Secondly, on the supply side, the FPC required each pipeline to
demonstrate that it had large reserves of gas under contract before
that company could construct a new line, extend an old line, sell
gas in new markets, or to sell more gas in old markets from existing
assets. Since these gas supply contracts were usually for twenty-year
terms, the FERC's requirement assured LDCs that the interstate
pipeline had supplies that were adequate to justify the local expense
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of shifting from coal gas to natural gas. They also assured end-users
that investments made in gas-using equipment could be amortized
over long periods.
Finally, on the demand side, the FPC limited access of competing
pipelines to certificated end-use markets thereby assuring incumbent
pipelines of protected markets for their gas reserves. In particular,
the strategy required LDCs to contract for pipeline capacity on a
long-term basis. To further strengthen each pipeline's monopoly
power, the FPC also approved tariffs for sales to LDCs that con-
tained minimum bills and, in some cases, sole supplier requirements.
Minimum bills effectively required LDCs to pay pipeline companies
a regulatorily-determined return on pipeline company assets whether
or not any gas was taken. In many cases, minimum bills also
required LDCs to pay for some volumes of gas whether or not such
gas was taken. Pipeline sole supplier tariff provisions gave preferred
rates to selected LDCs that agreed not to purchase gas from another
pipeline.
2. Consequences of the Strategy
Four important consequences resulted from this three-part
regulatory strategy, a strategy which still struggles for survival
despite the FERC's repeated efforts over the last five years to effect
fundamental changes. The first three consequences can be called the
key planks in the FPC-created system of bundled-service regulation.
The creation of these planks, and their subsequent undoing by
Order No. 436, produced major changes in the boundary between
state and federal jurisdictions.
One major effect of FPC regulation was to strengthen the natural-
monopoly powers inherent in the transportation of natural gas and
to extend those monopoly powers over sales of pipeline company gas
in interstate markets. Regulation also strengthened the pipeline
companies' monopsony powers in some wellhead markets in which
they purchased gas. This system of relatively strong monopolies
balkanized interstate natural gas markets. Price differences between
two points in space could substantially exceed the cost of shipping
gas between those two points since the space arbitrage mechanisms
for reducing those differences existed only at the sufferance of
pipelines-often pipelines with relatively high prices. Furthermore,
since gas prices were determined largely in long-term contracts, and
FERC-jurisdictional pipelines mostly were required to sell gas at the
price at which they purchased it, time arbitrage, or a gas futures
market, effectively was suppressed.
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Secondly, this regulatory regime placed pipeline companies at
the center of the interstate natural gas industry. Producers were
denied direct access to LDCs and end-users, and LDCs and end-
users were denied direct access to producers. Producers had to look
to pipelines to market their gas, and LDCs and end-users had to
look to pipelines for assurances of adequate supplies.
Thirdly, governmental regulation shifted the risks of the pipeline
industry downstream to end-users. The combination of strong
monopoly powers, limited market entry, minimum bills, and sole
supplier tariff provisions virtually guaranteed pipelines comfortable
earnings on their assets.
Finally, this regulatory system was acclaimed almost universally.
Financiers liked the assured earnings produced by strong pipeline
monopolies; therefore, they were willing to finance pipelines with
low equity ratios. Producers desperately wanted pipelines to be
constructed in order to sell the by-product gas that was nearly
worthless if sold near the field. LDCs found natural gas a much
cheaper fuel than coal gas, permitting them to expand their
operations and to displace coal in most major urban markets. The
FPC liked the system because the strong monopoly powers of
pipelines permitted a highly judicialized decisionmaking process
using traditional public utility regulatory methods. With strong
monopoly power in the hands of pipeline companies, timely
decisions were not essential. Due process-as defined by regulatory
procedures--could be honored in the belief that a refund was an
adequate remedy for mispricing. Because the key interest groups
profited under this regime, the politicians representing these
interests also liked the system.
One essential ingredient in this risk allocation strategy was what
later came to be called the Narragansett doctrine." 9 The crucial
holding in Narragansett was that a PUC could not question the
reasonableness of rates set by a federal regulatory agency. Conse-
quently, the decision assured LDCs that costs incurred for pipeline
company services could be recovered from LDC customers. As a
result, FPC regulation not only enabled pipeline companies to shift
the risks of their long-term contracts with producers to LDCs, it also
assured LDCs that those risks, and the risk of owning pipeline
assets, could be shifted to the LDC's customers. This regulatory
259. Narragansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 119 R.I. 559, 381 A.2d 1358 (R.I. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 972 (1978). The relevance of this doctrine is discussed supra notes 105-
116 and accompanying text.
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strategy relieved most LDCs of the responsibility of creating a supply
portfolio, a freedom that some LDCs liked, and which led some of
them to oppose the Order No. 436 reforms.
Nevertheless, the Narragansett doctrine was not sufficient to
support the FPC risk-allocation strategy. Another essential element
was constricting the scope of what later became known as the Pike
County exception to the Narragansett doctrine."6 Under Pike County,
a PUG can challenge the prudence of an LDC's purchasing decision
when the LDC has a choice of supply options. However, sole
supplier tariff provisions, minimum bills, and certification barriers
served to limit LDC choices and thereby to protect them from gas
purchasing prudence challenges by state PUCs.
Critics protested the unnecessary link between transportation and
sales, the monopsony power of pipelines in wellhead markets and
their monopoly power in city-gate markets, and the high costs borne
by consumers of carrying unnecessarily large gas reserves.2"'
However, one can argue that the FPC's regulatory strategy worked
well for several decades to move the system towards maturity.
Although market forces might be distorted by monopsony power,
monopoly power, and unnecessarily long-term, price-inflexible
contracts, they were not fully suppressed. Gas prices could still
respond to demand and supply forces, and could, therefore, play
their important equilibrating role.
C. The Natural Gas System After Phillips
The history of natural gas regulation between the 1954 Phillips
decision and the passage of the NGPA can be treated briefly. The
development of a system of vintaged wellhead prices, 62 the failure
260. Pike County Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Util. Comm'n, 77 Pa. Commw.
268, 465 A.2d 735 (1983). The Pike County case was an electricity case, but, it was applied
to the gas industry in .Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n,
791 F.2d 1111 (3rd Cir. 1986). See text following supra note 107.
261. FERC jargon, which is reflected in the language of this Article, emphasizes three
types of gas transactions: wellhead, city gate, and burner tip. The jargon, by implication,
reveals the pre-NGPA system of regulation, which largely equated wellhead transactions
with transactions between pipelines and producers, city-gate transactions with transactions
between pipelines and LDCs, and burnertip transactions with transactions between pipelines
or LDCs and end users. Since transactions between LDCs, or end users and producers
were uncommon in the interstate market, there was no special term for them. The terms
are, however, still useful to indicate the transportation point at which ownership changes.
262. The vintage price system was the FPCQFERC method for reconciling the
objectives of cost-based wellhead prices and adequate supplies in interstate markets.
Producers were not required to remain producers, nor were they required to sell new
discoveries, other than OCS discoveries, into interstate markets. As a result, given the below
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of the FPC to create wellhead prices sufficiently high to avoid a gas
shortage, the demise of the FPC, the creation of FERC, and the
passage of the NGPA are all interesting chapters. This topic,
however, does not require an extensive analysis. What is essential for
this discussion is a recognition that many of the decisions made in
the post-Phillips period still have vitality and continue to influence
the practices of LDCs, FERC, and the pipeline companies. Four
topics are particularly relevant.
First, the political consensus that supported early FPC regulation
broke down when the FPC, acting under the Phillips mandate,
extended controls to wellhead prices. Many producers found
regulation to be a severe constraint on their earnings, and con-
suming entities found their interests pitted against producers.
FPC/FERC proceedings became bitter battlegrounds between
producer and end-user interests with respective states and PUCs
closely aligned. The split spread to Congress, where the delegations
of the consuming states of California, the East, Northeast, and
Upper Midwest were brought into conflict with the delegations of
the producing states of the Middle South, Southwest, and Plains.26
Second, the balkanization of natural gas markets worsened
substantially after Phillips. The vintage pricing system induced
significant differences in gas prices from pipeline to pipeline.
Consequently, customers of pipeline companies with a large pro-
portion of old, low-priced gas in their portfolios, demanded that
such companies be severely limited in their abilities to sell gas off
system, to anyone other than old customers. To further preserve
old, low-priced gas to existing interstate customers, the FPC
determined that once identified gas from a producer was sold into
an interstate market, it was committed to interstate markets even
after expiration of the contract in which the commitment was made.
Producers who sold gas into intrastate markets could, after their
contract obligation expired, sell that gas into an interstate market.
market FPC/FERC-determined prices pipeline companies had difficulties attracting new
supplies. Raising the regulated price for "new" gas to reflect increases in production costs,
while leaving unchanged the price of "old" gas that was committed to interstate markets
earlier "when costs were lower," led to two different contract prices for gas entering a
pipeline at the same time at the same receipt point. After the regulated price for "new"
gas was raised several times, there were many prices. Generally, the later the year of
contracting, the higher the price of gas, at least until the early 1980s. The FPC/FERC
policy required pipelines to sell gas at a rolled-in price, i.e., at a weighted average of the
contract prices, where the weights were the relative quantities of gas flowing under each
contract.
263. This regional conflict is described in E. SANDERS, THE. REGULATION OF NATURAL
GAS: POLICY AND POLITICS, 1938-1978 (1981).
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However, when the contract for sale in the interstate market
expired, the gas remained committed to interstate markets. Arbitrage
between intrastate and interstate markets became a one-way flow.
Hence, producers with choices logically developed a preference for
selling in intrastate markets.
After the 1984 OPEC-induced increases in oil prices, gas prices
in intrastate markets rose commensurably since their prices were
not constrained by economic regulation. Prices in interstate markets,
however, were restrained by application of a regulatory model which
based gas prices on historical costs. Not surprisingly, a shortage
developed in interstate markets while intrastate markets had
abundant supplies for those willing to pay market-determined prices.
Third, the system of federal regulation in the post-Phillips period
developed into a certification quagmire. To control wellhead prices
and the flow of old vintage gas, the FPC evolved a complex system
of certifying pipeline construction and pipeline services. The
objectives were fairly straightforward: to ensure an adequate supply
of gas to interstate markets and, almost equally difficult, to ensure
that old vintage low-priced gas was not diverted from the particular
interstate pipeline to which it was assigned by contract.
Finally, as the probability of a natural gas shortage grew in the
1970s, the FPC/FERC was required to prioritize uses and end-users
of gas. 6 FERC's authority to allocate the scarce gas supplies of
interstate pipelines, when quantity demanded was greater than
quantity supplied at the regulated price, was extended to allocations
to direct sales customers of the pipeline, to LDCs served by the
pipeline, and to customers of LDCs who were served indirectly by
the pipeline.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is useful to summarize the
characteristics of the industry's structure and the regulatory system
that existed at the time of the passage of the NGPA.
By 1978, the natural gas industry had reached maturity. It
consisted of pipelines with strong monopoly and monopsony powers
and of LDCs with strong monopoly powers. Consequently, highly
balkanized markets existed at wellheads and city-gates, rather than
a national market for gas with space and time arbitrage inducing
efficient allocations of natural gas.2' The interstate system was, with
264. The current FERC curtailment rules, which reflect Title IV of the Natural Gas
Curtailment Policies Act (NGPA), are found in 18 C.F.R. § 281 (1989).
265. While there were intrastate gas markets in many states only five were large:
Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Kansas and California. Furthermore, all but California were
major exporters of gas.
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many qualifications, a set of vertically integrated markets that were
horizontally unintegrated. Furthermore, the absence of a futures
market for gas meant that only producers could engage in profitable
and constructive speculation.
In addition, by the mid-1970s a large proportion of natural gas
was being found through a deliberate search for gas. Associated
gas-gas found intermixed with oil and usually discovered in the
search for oil-was not sufficient to meet demand. Consequently,
because of nonassociated gas's sensitivity to selling prices, efficient
wellhead prices became crucially important for an efficient gas
industry.
Furthermore, the risks of gas price volatility, which the FPC
shifted to end-users with its bundled-service regulatory strategy, were
growing over time. In 1960, the average burner-tip price was com-
prised of 23 percent wellhead price, 43.5 percent LDC margin, and
33.5 percent pipeline margin.2" The 1970s brought large changes in
these numbers, with the producers' share rising steadily. By 1978,
when the NGPA was passed, the producers' share was 41.4 percent
while the LDC's share had fallen to 33.9 percent, and the pipelines'
share to 25.7 percent. This trend continued into the 1980s. By 1982,
the producers' share had increased to 55.1 percent while the
pipelines' share had fallen to 25.8 percent.267 The LDCs' share had
fallen even more, to 19.1 percent.'"
This change in relative value added, together with the incentive
structure that regulators had created, made losses for pipeline
companies in their merchant roles more likely than in their trans-
portation roles. Consequently, pipeline companies possessed strong
reasons for using their monopoly powers over transportation to
protect themselves from merchant losses, even at the expense of
efficient operation of pipeline transportation and storage assets.
Denying transportation services to competing sellers of gas became
an increasingly important element in most interstate pipelines' profit
strategy.
266. See AMERiCAN GAS ASS'N, GAS FACTS 1985: A STATISTICAL RECORD OF THE GAS
UTIUTY INDUSTRY (1986).
267. Furthermore, while pipelines in 1982 contributed approximately 25% of value
added in the natural gas industry, FERC did not regulate all pipelines. One estimate,
floating at FERC in 1984 and 1985 when Order No. 436 was being formulated, was that
the pipelines regulated by the FERC contributed less than 15% of the value added by the
natural gas industry.
268. Recent years have seen a return to numbers similar to 1978. However, the
1982 numbers are likely to be representative of the future of the industry when the natural
gas "deliverability bubble" ends.
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D. Regulation After the NGPA
The NGPA was important both for what it did explicitly and for
some of its unanticipated consequences.2 It did two important
things explicitly. First, it made major changes in the regulation of
gas pricing by removing almost all of FERG's authority to set prices.
It exaggerated the vintage pricing system by creating very high
congressionally-determined prices for some new gas, and it extended
federal regulation over wellhead prices to intrastate gas."" It also, in
effect, reversed the Phillips decision and initiated a process of phased
deregulation of wellhead prices."' As old gas was depleted and
replaced by new gas, the wellhead market was to assume an
increasing role in determining the price of natural gas. The Act,
therefore, removed from FERC the role of determining adequate
price incentives for the production of optimal quantities of gas.272 As
market forces strengthened, the legal and economic justification for
much of FERC's certificate regulation would disappear-most
obviously with respect to producer/wellhead certification. 2 s Less
obvious, but of equal importance, much of the certification regula-
tion, based on the need to allocate scarce pipeline supplies to end-
uses and end-users by FERC- and Congressionally-determined
priority classifications, would also disappear.
Secondly, with Section 311, the NGPA opened a door for
integrating state and national markets, and for separating the
transportation and merchant roles of interstate pipelines. In
269. This position has been adopted in hindsight. Two provisions of the NGPA
considered important at the time were Title II-Incremental Pricing, and Title IV-Natural
Gas Curtailment Policies. Events of the 1980s have eliminated, at least temporarily, the
significance of both Titles. The two Titles reflect different, but complementary, exercises of
federal authority to influence uses of gas. Title IV was discussed above. See supra note 264.
Title II can be succinctly and fairly described, despite the complexity of its language, as
directing FERC to discriminate in prices against customers using gas as a boiler fuel and
other industrial gas users defined by FERC. Title II was repealed by Section 2 of P.L. No.
100-42, May 21, 1987.
270. 15 U.S.C. § 3315 (1988).
271. 15 U.S.C. § 3311 (1988).
272. One qualification to this statement is the responsibilities assigned to FERC in
15 U.S.C. § 3317 (1988) to create incentive prices for high-cost gas.
273. After Phillips, the FPC required that producers who wanted to sell gas in
interstate markets obtain a certificate of PC&N.
274. The relevant Subsections of Section 311 are:
(a)(1)(A) In General-The Commission may, by rule or order, authorize any interstate
pipeline to transport natural gas on behalf of (i) any intrastate pipeline; and (ii) any local
distribution company.
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implementing Section 311, the Commission allowed certain trans-
actions to go forward on a self-implementing basis without the
detailed FERC review process that was customary in certification
proceedings under Section 7 of the NGA.' 75 In Order No. 60, the
Commission also permitted interstate pipelines to transport natural
gas on behalf of other interstate pipelines.276 While the Congres-
sional drafters of Section 311 probably intended to provide supply-
deficit interstate markets with opportunities to tap the abundant
supplies in intrastate markets, the language they used was broad and
permanent. By encouraging pipelines to transport gas-to provide
an unbundled service-one of the key planks in the FPC-created
bundled-service system of regulation was weakened. Customers who
had choices could partially escape the monopoly power over gas
sales formerly held by the pipeline company. In so doing, the risk
bearing role of the customer could also be reduced.277
The important, unanticipated consequences of the NGPA came
about when the 1982 recession occurred. The demand reductions
induced by the recession increased dramatically the size of the
deliverability bubble and led to falling gas and oil prices. Gas price
reductions, however, were concentrated in intrastate markets and the
rapidly developing spot market. Because of regulatory and contract
rigidities, interstate pipelines could not quickly lower their prices.
These prices had risen dramatically after passage of the NGPA as
interstate pipelines had attempted to buy new gas to meet demands
and to increase reserves.278 Meanwhile, big end-users, resisting prices
charged by pipelines for gas that exceeded fuel oil prices, demanded
(a)(2)(A) In General-The Commission may, by rule or order, authorize any intrastate
pipeline to transport natural gas on behalf of (i) any interstate pipeline; and (ii) any local
distribution company served by any interstate pipeline.
(b)(1) In General-The Commission may, by rule or order, authorize any intrastate
pipeline to sell natural gas to (i) any interstate pipeline; and (ii) any local distribution
company served by any interstate pipeline.
275. FERC implemented Section 311 in Order Nos. 30 (7 FERC 1 61,170), 46 (9
FERC 1 61,724), 60 (9 FERC 61,224), 63 (10 FERC 61,003), 234-B (24 FERC 61,099),
and 319, (24 FERC 1 61,100). Order No. 436 expanded the scope of Section 311 still
further.
276. FERC Stats. & Regs. 1 30,107 (1979).
277. This weakening of pipeline company monopoly powers also meant the weakening
of LDC monopoly powers and state powers that relied on such monopolies. For example,
those states that levied gross revenue taxes on LDC sales saw shifts of large customers to
transportation-only services since such a shift saved the customer the gross revenue taxes
on out-of-state gas purchases.
278. Gas supplies are customarily measured in both stock and flow terms. Proven
reserves is the stock variable, and deliverability, i.e., the capability to withdraw from proven
reserves, is the flow variable. The excess supply in the 1980s was, and is, in deliverability.
Whether there is an excess or shortage of proven reserves is hotly contested.
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price discounts or, alternatively, transportation privileges in order to
gain access to spot market gas. Since many big users had alternate
fuel capability, pipelines had to meet these demands or lose these
customers to fuel oil. Intrastate pipelines, with NGPA Section 311
rights to sell their surplus gas into the interstate market, were also
pressing for transportation rights on interstate pipelines.
FERC, responding to pipeline requests and large end-user
bargaining power, approved several programs to deal with this
problem. Despite the patchwork nature of these programs, they were
important in broadening and deepening spot markets. Many of these
programs were merely straightforward pipeline company discount
sales programs aimed at price-elastic markets. More important,
however, were those programs that made it possible for end-users
to buy directly from producers and have pipelines carry the gas.
Order No. 234-B and the Special Marketing Programs (SMPs)
deserve special mention.279 Order No. 234-B was a temporary,
experimental program that permitted pipelines to obtain blanket
certificates to transport gas to low priority end-users. The SMPs
permitted pipelines, producers, and marketers to obtain certificates
to transport or sell gas that was committed to a pipeline, if the
pipeline released the gas. Order No. 319 established a permanent
program that allowed pipelines to transport gas for high priority
end-users."8 ' These programs complemented NGPA Section 311 and
helped initiate significant steps towards disintermediation in natural
gas markets. End-users and producers increasingly bypassed pipeline
company merchants and negotiated directly with each other.
These programs, with the possible exception of Order No. 319,
systematically discriminated against residential and commercial
customers. While pipelines and producers were eager to implement
special programs in order to lower prices to customers who could
use other fuels, they were not eager to permit residential and
commercial customers to gain such privileges. These captive
customers were expected to remain tied to a bundled service so that
279. The Order No. 234-B program, 24 FERC 1 61,099 (1983), was originally
scheduled to expire on June 30, 1985. The D.C. Circuit ruled the program to be unduly
discriminatory on May 10, 1985, but allowed the program to continue through October 12,
1985. Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (MPC 1);
Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (MPC II).
280. The SMP programs were also experimental and expired on October 31, 1985,
after the D.C. Circuit Court in the MPC I and MPC II cases held the programs to be
unduly discriminatory.
281. Order No. 319, 24 FERC 61,100 (1983), was issued on the same day as Order
No. 234-B.
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pipelines and producers could convey to them the high-cost gas
contracted for before the deliverability surplus developed. Not only
were these prices higher than the market would absorb if free
purchasing were permitted, but in many cases these prices were
indexed to rise despite falling demand. As late as January 1, 1985,
many people were fearful that such indexing would push prices
significantly upward despite a large and increasingly prolonged
deliverability bubble.
FERC attempted to increase opportunities for LDCs to gain access
to spot markets and other relatively low-priced gas through two
actions. First, in May 1984, in Order No. 380, FERC reduced
somewhat the burden of minimum bills by prohibiting pipelines from
recovering variable costs for gas not taken;"2 and (2), in its revised
special marketing program orders, FERC required pipelines
participating in such programs to allow LDCs to purchase up to ten
percent of their contract demands from spot markets.
Although Order No. 380 still required LDCs to pay minimum
bills sufficiently large to cover pipelines' fixed costs, it did increase
the ability of LDCs served by two or more pipelines to shift sources
of supply.83 In so doing, LDCs increased competitive pressures on
pipelines and encouraged them to renegotiate gas-purchase contracts
wherever possible.
By May 1985, when the D.C. Circuit ruled on the Maryland
Peoples' Counsel cases,"l' the FPC-created system of bundled-service
regulation was still largely intact, but it was cracking and crumbling.
The Narragansett doctrine remained the dominant instrument for
pipelines to shift risk, and, with few exceptions, bundled services
were the only services available to LDCs. The Pike County doctrine,
however, was assuming greater importance as LDCs' alternatives
increased.
E. FERC's Order No. 436
FERC intended Order No. 436, promulgated in October 1985, to
facilitate economic efficiency through intensified competition."5 The
282. Elimination of Variable Costs From Certain Natural Gas Pipeline Minimum
Commodity Bill Provisions, FERC Stats. & Regs., 1 30,571 (1984). A minimum bill, as the
name suggests, required the customer to pay the pipeline for a minimum quantity of gas
when the LDC took less than that quantity from the pipeline. See supra Part II, Section B.2.
283. On a case-by-case basis, FERC has largely eliminated minimum bills.
284. See supra note 279.
285. See supra note 258.
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drafters of Order No. 436 thought that by redrawing the boundaries
between market forces and regulatory controls, they could also alter
the jurisdictional boundaries between federal and state regulators. In
particular, Order No. 436 limited the range of discretion in the
pricing of LDC services. By inducing interstate pipelines to allow
others to compete with pipeline company merchants, FERC expected
that pipeline incentives would change. The fortunes of the pipeline
companies would depend more on their transportation services and
less on their merchant services. Also, allowing others to use pipeline
assets to carry and store gas would create horizontal gas markets to
complement and discipline the traditional vertical markets. As a
result of the competitive forces released by Order No. 436, FERC
hoped that LDCs would be compelled to assume greater respon-
sibility for their gas supplies. Furthermore, by expanding the choices
available to LDCs to include opportunities to deal directly with
producers, Order No. 436 gave state PUCs a more important role
in evaluating the gas portfolio decisions of LDCs under the Pike
County doctrine. Consequently, LDCs and PUCs gained responsibility
to make decisions on the degree of security for which they would be
willing to pay, while FERC shed its responsibilities in this area. 8'
FERC's Order No. 436 was intended to induce the players-LDCs,
pipelines, large industrial gas users, electric utilities, and PUCs-to
seek an allocation of gas-supply risks that was acceptable to all. In
appreciation of the magnitude of the problem and the deficiencies
of federal regulators in making such decisions, FERC's Order No.
436 was emphatic: FERC would not use federal powers to force
LDCs to assume these risks. Consequently, Order No. 436, when
fully implemented, will eliminate the three key planks of the FPC-
created system of bundled-service regulation.
Order No. 436 also encouraged competition between pipelines
and LDCs in ways that promised to alter fundamental relations
between LDCs and their large customers. After the issuance of
Order No. 436, many states required their LDCs to offer un-
bundled transportation services. Consequently, just as LDCs were
bypassing pipeline company merchant services and buying gas
directly from producers and non-jurisdictional merchants, large
customers of LDCs were bypassing both LDC and pipeline mer-
286. This transfer of responsibilities did not occur upon issuance of Order No. 436.
That order contained a contract demand conversion schedule that limited the LDCs' abilities
to cease purchasing gas from the pipeline. Complete abandonment of pipeline company
merchant services was scheduled to take five years, although each pipeline was free to allow
its customers an accelerated schedule. See infra note 288.
490
Vol. 7: 427, 1990
Tensions in Energy Regulation
chants to buy from producers and non-jurisdictional merchants.
More troublesome to LDCs, and to many PUCs, however, were
actions by large customers of LDCs to connect directly to an
interstate pipeline and bypass the LDC entirely."7
The D.C. Circuit Court reviewed Order No. 436 in AGD v.
FERC.211 One issue in that review was whether the order unduly
weakened the abilities of PUCs to deter bypass of LDC merchant
and transportation services. The Court rejected arguments by LDCs
and PUCs that FERC should exercise its regulatory powers to
preserve the PUCs' powers to maintain economically inefficient
prices. The language used is strong:
If states choose to require LDCs to continue service to non-
paying customers, those states must address the consequences.
They can extract the cost from price-inelastic customers,
primarily the solvent residential customers; they can seek to
extract the cost from industrial customers, at the peril of
driving them off the system; they can fund the expense out of
tax revenues; they can use their power under [Panhandle
Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 341
U.S. 329, 336 (1951)] to thwart the possible bypass, accepting
the economic consequence that their industrial gas users may
be unable to compete with firms in other states. All these
choices may involve some pain-like all true choices. But that
hardly requires the Commission to abandon its effort, required
under the NGA, to facilitate the flow of competitively-priced
gas into the hands of gas consumers everywhere.
287. For a detailed discussion of the effect of Order No. 436 on LDC bypass, see
Broadman & Kalt, How Natural is Monopoly? The Case of Bypass in Natural Gas Distribution
Markets, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 181 (1989). For a discussion of the theory of optimal bypass,
see MacAvoy, Spulber & Stangle, Is Competitiv Entry Free? Bypass and Partial Deregulation in
Natural Gas Markets, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 209 (1989).
288. See Associated Gas Distribs. [AGD] v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Despite a vigorous endorsement of the power of FERC to adopt and implement the
principal objectives of Order No. 436, the Court vacated the Order because of dissatisfac-
tion with FERC's handling of the "contracts problem," that is, the take-or-pay problems of
pipelines arising from their contracts with producers. The Court also demanded better
justification from FERC for its grant of privilege to LDCs to reduce unilaterally their
contract demand obligation to pipelines in accordance with a schedule determined by
FERC. In August 1987, FERC repromulgated the substance of Order No. 436 in Order
No. 500, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Control, 52 Fed. Reg.
30,334 (1987). Extension and interpretations are contained in Order Nos. 500-A, -B, -C,
-D, -E, -F, -G, and -H. For simplicity of language, the term Order No. 436 should be
understood to include all of these when the context suggests a post-August 1987 period.
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Physical bypass has not been a frequent phenomenon since AGD
v. FERC, but it occasionally has happened. It was quickly observed
that the Panhandle case cited in ACD v. FERC did not offer PUCs
much ability to deter bypass of an LDC's merchant function." 9 A
1989 case, Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline
Co., 290 confirmed this view. In that case, the Sixth Circuit upheld
FERC's right to permit an interstate pipeline to bypass an LDC.
The Court held that the Panhandle to National Steel bypass of
Michigan Consolidated Gas "involves merely interstate transportation
of natural gas . . . and not local distribution."29' The Court also
rejected the argument that the authorization of the bypass was an
abuse of FERC powers because the bypass allowed the pipeline to
engage in the functional equivalent of local distribution. It said,
"Given the careful and continuing attention that Congress has
focused on the natural gas industry, we are of the view that if
Congress had intended to except the 'functional equivalent' of 'local
distribution' from federal jurisdiction, it would have stated so by
nOW,
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F Summary of Natural Gas Industry Regulation
Although many state PUCs have protested parts of Order No.
436, including FERC's decision to allow LDC bypass, the over-
whelming majority have not. That reaction, other PUC responses,
and direct communications from state commissioners support the
conclusion that PUCs are generally more willing to lose their
discretion to market forces than to FERC. The contrast between
PUC reactions to FERC's Middle South and AEP decisions and their
response to Order No. 436 decisions offers further support for this
conclusion.
The principal conclusion drawn from this survey of gas industry
regulation is that the Order No. 436 reforms, especially the creation
of a competitive interstate market for natural gas, have created the
possibility of a division of labor between federal and state regulators
that will be tolerable to both sets of regulators, the legislators, the
289. See Address by Wendell H. Adair, Jr., ABA annual meeting (1987) (entitled The
Constitution and Energy: Supremacy, Federalism and Energy Policy).
290. 887 F.2d 1295 (6th Cir. 1989).
291. The Court added, "In this case it is undisputed that the retail sale of natural
gas occurs in Oklahoma, where National Steel purchases it for its use at its plant in
Detroit." 887 F.2d at 1300.
292. 887 F.2d at 1300 (footnote omitted).
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courts, and all segments of the industry. The three most obvious
qualifications to this optimistic view arise from concerns that (1)
FERC will not sustain its efforts to create and preserve a competitive
natural gas market, (2) FERC will not develop an LDC-bypass policy
that distinguishes between efficient and inefficient bypass that satisfies
PUCs, and (3) the participants in the industry will fail to develop a
system of risk allocation that satisfies regulators and legislators.
Since all these concerns seem manageable within the existing
framework of Order No. 436, a forecast of a diminution of the past
and current level of tension between federal and state regulators on
issues relating to the natural gas industry seems plausible.
Conclusion
The last two decades have been years of turmoil in the Ameri-
can economy. Historically high inflation rates, historically high
nominal and real interest rates, serious recessions (by post-World
War II standards), productivity increase slowdowns, economic growth
slowdowns, and increasing integration of the economy into the
international economy have marked these decades. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the 1970s and 1980s also have been tumultuous
ones for the natural gas and electric industries, their financiers, and
their economic regulators. After twenty-five years of what utilities
and their financiers might call the Golden Age of economic regula-
tion, the 1970s and 1980s became years of testing. Investment
strategies, pricing policies, risk allocation policies, and decision-
making procedures have been tested in the crucible of political
controversy. All have been found wanting to varying degrees. The
fundamental institutions, however, both public and private, have
survived surprisingly well, albeit with modifications and with wounds
that will not soon be forgotten.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the earlier intellectual discontent
with the performance of economic regulation matured into a political
cause. The twenty-five or so years following World War II were not
seen as a Golden Age of economic regulation by economists
evaluating industry performances against the standard of economic
efficiency. By the mid-1970s "regulatory reform" and "deregulation"
had become useful slogans for both major political parties. Further-
more, technological change, especially in computers and telemeter-
ing, continued at a rapid rate during the 1970s and 1980s. In the
sense captured well by Joseph Schumpeter's phrase "creative
destruction," this technological improvement complemented the
macroeconomic changes to undermine the status quo in the electric
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and natural gas industries. In the electric industry, the degree of
balkanization of the industry into free standing, vertically integrated
utilities continued to diminish as economies of scale in transmission
increased and as the cost of coordination among utilities decreased.
In the natural gas industries, the improvements in telemetering, in
computational technologies, and in telecommunications comple-
mented the changing relative value-added contributions of the
segments of the industry to encourage the unbundling of pipeline
company services leading to new allocations of risks.
All these forces, and the chosen responses of regulators and
regulatees to the forces, produced a testing of the inherited
boundaries between state and federal regulatory jurisdictions and
between regulated and non-regulated activities. The analysis herein
suggests that the testing will continue and will likely cause significant
movements in both boundaries.
The exogenous forces emphasized in the analysis were those most
closely related to dislodging the jurisdictional boundaries between
state and federal regulatory agencies. Some of these forces were
recognized as, in principle, reversible while others are, in principle,
non-reversible. The major non-reversible exogenous forces are the
technological changes in telecommunications, telemetering, and
computational abilities; the increased economies of scale in electricity
transmission; and the internationalization of the American economy.
The major exogenous forces that are reversible in principle are the
emergence of inflation rates significantly higher than productivity
increase rates, and the emergence of real and nominal interest rates
significantly higher than those traditionally used when justifying
large, long-gestation generating plants and pipelines. Reversibility in
principle is not a forecast that a reverse will occur. The productivity
slowdown, when combined with regulatory lag, converted the
virtuous cycle of the Golden Age of economic regulation into the
vicious cycle of the last two decades. The high real interest rates
reduced emphasis on capital-intense production strategies in both the
electric and natural gas industries. In the electric industry, this
relative factor-cost change is especially important since it diminishes
the significance of past economies of scale in generation. This
diminution in economies of scale may reduce the monopoly power
of regulated firms and, consequently, limit the pricing and invest-
ment discretion of regulators.
The major policy decision that molded regulatory agencies'
responses to these exogenous forces was to expand the role of
competition in selected segments of these regulated industries. Many
minor policy decisions, made in particular cases, complemented or
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qualified this major decision. A direct consequence of this policy
stance was to shift certain powers from regulators, both those who
made the decisions and those in other jurisdictions, to markets. A
secondary consequence of this policy stance was to require regulators
to respect market forces somewhat more when making pricing and
investment decisions within their discretion; it was difficult to urge
competition in some dimensions and refuse to promote efficiency in
others. However, this shift to efficiency as a regulatory objective also
arose because increasing competition in certain activities limited
regulatory discretion in other areas. Monopoly power that is
eliminated cannot continue to be exercised.
In the natural gas industry, the Order No. 436 decisions have
greatly reduced both the scope of FERC's regulatory authority and
the range of discretion in most of the areas it continues to regulate.
In contrast, by diminishing the practical significance of the Narragan-
sett doctrine and expanding the practical significance of the Pike
County doctrine, the Order No. 436 decisions greatly expanded the
scope of state PUCs' regulatory oversight of LDC procurement
decisions. Simultaneously, however, these orders set in motion
competitive forces that will severely limit the range of PUG discre-
tion in the exercise of those authorities.
Regulators and legislators who believe that the important objective
of regulation is the creation and perpetuation of prices and services
that cannot be sustained in the presence of strong competitive forces
will consider the Order No. 436 decisions a serious infringement on
state prerogatives. In contrast, those who think that economic
efficiency is an important objective of economic regulation will view
these decisions as properly redrawing the boundaries, both the
boundaries between state and federal regulators, and between market
forces and regulatory constraints.
In the electric industry, FERC has adopted potentially conflicting
policies that reflect the current schizophrenia in the industry. On
one hand, it has promoted competition in wholesale markets to
utilize existing plants more efficiently, hastened the entry of IPPs
into wholesale markets, and encouraged states to create bidding
systems to discipline offers of incremental generating capacity from
non-traditional suppliers. By doing this, FERC has used the Pike
County doctrine to expand the scope of PUG jurisdictions. Simul-
taneously, however, the developing competition limits the range of
regulatory discretion available to states who endorse competitive
acquisition. On the other hand, FERC has protected multistate
holding companies from PUG actions that might have intensified
competition among operating subsidiaries of the holding company,
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and between those companies and companies outside the holding
company. This policy has narrowed the scope of the Pike County
doctrine. Both FERC policies tend to limit, but do not eliminate, the
abilities of states to use their utilities as instruments in statewide
planning of generating capacity.
State and federal cooperation and conflicts in the regulation of
the natural gas industry are of special interest because they high-
light the types of tensions to be expected if competition in electri-
city wholesale markets continues to spread and intensify. In both
industries, the proportion of value-added at the distribution level is
small-below twenty-five percent. With such small markups, a
significant part of which must be devoted to paying variable costs,
distribution companies can allow themselves to become major risk-
bearers for upstream segments of the industry only if their monop-
oly power is sufficient to support substantial price increases when
required. Only when FERC demonstrated a clear preference for
routing gas sales through LDCs, by discouraging bypass, did LDCs
have such monopoly power. In the electric industry, the vertical
integration of the industry--especially the ownership by the distribu-
tion company of the transmission assets needed for bypass--currently
provides the distribution companies with such monopoly power.
If FERC continues to encourage competition in the generating
sector, and moves to grant generous transmission access rights to
generators and distribution utilities, electricity distribution companies
will be required to adjust-as most gas distribution companies
already have adjusted-to less pricing discretion to avoid the
constant threat of bypass. Distribution companies with small mark-
ups that cannot coerce their customers to bear significantly higher
prices than available in an adjoining area cannot permit themselves
to become major risk-bearers for upstream segments of the industry.
The principal conclusion drawn from this study of the electric
industry is that, despite the efforts of many states to increase their
influence over electric utility planning, the states... will lose much of
the discretion they now possess in determining electric industry
prices, investment strategies, and fuel mixes. While their influence
over the distribution sector of the industry will remain great, even
there the possibility of bypass will restrain the exercise of pricing
discretion. Some of the influence lost by states will accrue to FERC
(or perhaps to new regional bodies), but much of it will be lost to
293. With the obvious exceptions of Alaska, Hawaii, and perhaps the Electric Relia-
bility Council of Texas (ERCOT) area of Texas.
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markets. The march of technology seems uni-directional in this
industry. Telemetering, computational abilities, and decreasing real
costs of transmission services have already created spans of opera-
tional control far larger than all but the largest states. The nation
will exploit the resulting productivity gains either by mergers of
existing vertically integrated utilities into larger firms that can
promise to deliver those gains by systems of command and control,
or by the creation of competitive generating markets and broadly
defined transmission rights for generators and distribution com-
panies. In the former case, influence will shift from the states to
FERC, if the holding company form of organization is adopted. In
the latter case, influence will shift from states and from FERC to
markets, with states retaining influence over the purchasing decisions
of distribution companies. The former approach will probably
intensify state/federal conflicts, certainly if the holding company form
of organization is adopted. The latter holds the promise of creating
a sustainable division of labor between state and federal regulators.
The latter would parallel the current evolution of the gas industry
and is in rough conformity with the PURPA Section 210 model that
already operates in the electric industry. Furthermore, the com-
petitive approach holds a promise that the responsibilities remaining
on regulators might be small enough for them to fulfill effectively
even under current procedural constraints.

